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COMMISSIONING THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
Jolina C. Cuaresma±
There has been much debate over the ConsumerFinancial
ProtectionBureau'slack of executive and congressionaloversight:
its single directorremovable only for cause and its operationsare
not subject to appropriations. This paper explains how this very
leadershio and accountability structure-intended to politically
insulate the agency-hadthe perverse effect ofpoliticizingit. Since

± Jolina C. Cuaresma is a Fellow with the Federal Legislation Clinic at
Georgetown University Law Center, where her seminar classes focus on
statutory implementation. She is also an adjunct professor at University of
California, Berkeley School of Law. From 2012 through 2015, she worked at the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, first as an Attorney-Advisor in the
Office of Supervision Policy, then in the Office of Consumer Response
responsible for student loans, and finally in the Office of Regulations.
I am thankful to Dee Pridgen for supporting my legal scholarship and to the
Loyola Consumer Law Review for inviting me to participate in its symposium.
For their insightful comments on earlier drafts and their steadfast friendship
through the years, I am much obliged to my former Berkeley Law professors
Howard A. Shelanski
and
Robert C. Berring,
and
my
colleagues
William E. White and William R. Baker III. I am fortunate to participate in
Georgetown's Clinical Fellowship program led by Deborah Epstein and
Wallace J. Mlyniec. This paper benefitted from the observations and clarifying,
questions of Robin West and Greg Klass, and participants in their SJD Fellows'
Colloquium. This paper also benefitted from exceptional research assistance
from Alex Petros, Georgetown Law Class of 2019, who has a tireless work ethic
and an encyclopedic knowledge of all things political, and Research Services
Librarian Jeremy McCabe, who is unflappable and the kind of colleague any
member of academia would want on her team. My first foray into academic
writing took a village: Samara, who does not believe in writer's block, kept me
on task and organized my research; my Clinic Director Alvaro Bedoya and my
co-Fellow Elly Kugler, who are some of the very finest human beings I have
ever had the good fortune to work with and learn from, made writing this paper
possible; and John Carbonell, Joscelyn Daguna, Sejal Dav6, Brian Fink, Maria
and Mark Mango, Martha McIntosh, and Sara Switzer supported me in
countless ways.
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DirectorCordray'sdeparture, there has been increasedregulatory
uncertainty, discouraging financial innovation and harming
consumer welfare. This paper recommends that Congress
restructure the Bureau into a multi-member, bipartisan
commission to provide industry regulatory predictability and
ensure that consumerprotection retainsits independentseat in the
financialregulatorysystem.
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INTRODUCTION
"CFPB head, charged with protecting consumers, says
people need 'to help themselves.""
That was the headline of a Los Angeles Times article
reporting on an April 17, 2019 speech by Kathy Kraninger, the
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB" or
"Bureau"). To be fair, she did explain that the agency plays a

' David Lazarus, CFPB head, charged with protecting consumers, says
people need 'to help themselves', L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.latimes.comlbusiness/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-cfpb-kraninger-takesconsumers-to-school-20190419-story.html.
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central role in accomplishing this. "Our first tool is education....
Empowering consumers to help themselves, protect their own
interests, and choose the financial products and services that best
fit their needs is vital to preventing consumer harm and building
financial well-being." 2 Kraninger then enumerated the agency's
other oversight tools: rulemaking and guidance next, followed by
supervision, and finally enforcement. By ranking the agency's
tools, she signaled what would be the Bureau's priorities under her
leadership: the CFPB would focus on teaching consumers how to
protect themselves first and enforcing consumer protection
statutes last.
Unsurprisingly, consumer advocates were critical, pointing
to the Bureau's history: "This agency was created to be a cop on
the beat, not a kindergarten teacher." Fortunately for Kraninger,
the agency's priorities are entirely within her prerogative. In fact,
regardless of whether President Trump or Congress supports her
agenda, they are statutorily powerless to affect the Bureau's
policies. Why? For the simple reason that the single director-led
CFPB has less executive andless congressional oversight than any
other existing federal agency.4 This Article proposes that this level
of independence explains in large part why the Bureau is failing to
fully implement the statutory programs set out in Title X of the
2 Kathleen L. Kraninger, Director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Speech to the Bipartisan Policy Center, a Washington, D.C. think tank
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/kathleen-kraninger-director-consumer-financial-protectionbureau-bipartisan-policy-center-speech/.
Lazarus, supra note 1.
Many generally consider the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("Federal Reserve") as the most powerful independent agency with its
authority over monetary policy. Unlike the CFPB, however, the Federal
Reserve's power is diffused among its seven-member board. 12 U.S.C. § 241
(2015).
5 See Robert O'Harrow Jr. et al., How Trump appointees curbed a
consumer protection agency loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.comlinvestigations/how-trump-appointeescurbed-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-thegop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20-11e8-aa3353bad9a881e8_story.html?utmterm=.be04f90c5737 (Former House Financial
Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank, co-author of the statute, believes
that the agency's mission is not being fulfilled under the Trump administration);
Nick Tabor, Barney Frank on His Regrets From the Great Recession, N.Y.
MAG (Aug. 8, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/08/barney-frank-onhis-regrets-from-the-great-recession.litml (Frank calling the CFPB's acting
director a "thug" for refusing to enforce the rules, and noting that the problem is
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act").6
. To be clear, the agency has had success since it formally
began operations in July 2011. It developed a platform that allows
distressed individuals to submit their problems to the agency and
to receive a response from financial companies.' The CFPB
returned well over $12 billion to American consumers by bringing
more than 200 enforcement cases.' The Bureau even established
the first ever federal supervision program over nonbanks to
examine them for compliance with consumer financial protection
law.9 These accomplishments, however, belie the Bureau's
specific to the Bureau).
6 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
7 See CFPB Launches Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU (June 19, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-consumercomplaint-database. On July 21, 2011, the same day that it formally began
operations, the CFPB started accepting credit card complaints through its
website. That December, it began taking mortgage complaints. Now the agency
takes complaints on an array of financial products: bank accounts and services,
private student loans, and consumer loans (March 2012); credit reporting
(October 2012); money transfers (April 2013); debt collection (July 2013); payday
loans (November 2013), prepaid cards, credit repair, debt settlement, pawn and
title loans (July 2014); virtual currency (August 2014); federal student loans
(February 2016); and online market lending (March 2016). The CFPB forwards
the consumer's complaint to the company and tracks the company's response.
The consumer can also provide the agency with feedback on the company's
response. Since 2012, the CFPB publishes certain information from complaints
in its Consumer Complaint Database that anyone can use to make comparisons
among financial companies. Kraninger has not yet determined whether the
Database will remain public. The industry has long lobbied for it to become
private, but consumer advocates argue that keeping it public incentivizes
companies to resolve consumers' complaints. Pete Schroeder & Katanga
Johnson, Exclusive: New US. consumer watchdog chief to continue review of
2019),
18,
(Apr.
complaints database, fair lending, REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cfpb-interview-exclusive/exclusivenew-us-consumer-watchdog-chief-to-continue-review-of-complaints-databasefair-lending-idUSKCN1RU244.
8 Christopher L. Peterson, Dormant: The Consumer FinancialProtection
Bureau'sLaw Enforcement Program in Decline, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AM.

16

(Mar.

12,

2019),

https://consumerfed.org/wp-.

content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf (dollar amount is
based on both direct relief and forgiven debts from July 18, 2012 to March 8,
2019).
9 As a general matter, depository institutions have been subject to
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vulnerability and its decreasing influence in the consumer
financial services industry.
July 21, 2619 marks nine years since the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act, and the partisan attacks over the CFPB-which
predated its inception-continue unabated. The period has been
an unproductive cycle marked by resistance from the Republicans
to purported strong implementation of the Bureau's powers by the
Obama administration, followed by resistance from the Democrats
to the Trump administration's seemingly weak use of the Bureau's
authority. Partisan bickering, however, is not new. Much more
concerning is the ensuing regulatory uncertainty. Aside from
making compliance unduly burdensome for industry, the lack of
regulatory predictability discourages investment. This is especially
problematic in fintech, where financial products are based on
technological advancements in areas such as machine learning and
natural language processing. The lack of a predictable regulatory
landscape stymies innovation without any countervailing
consumer benefits.
This Article argues that the problem is the Bureau's
combination of leadership and accountability structure. Reforming
it can place the agency on more stable political footing and
establish a more predictable regulatory environment. Considerable
academic literature exists on Congress' use of agency design to
control the modern administrative state. Yale Law Professor
Roberta Romano recently argued that the CFPB's institutional
design and accountability, compared to three similar agencies,
explains its regulatory strategy.1 0 She recommends reforming the
Bureau to increase its democratic accountability and legitimacy,
but does not address which structure-independent commission or
examinations for compliance with Federal consumer protection laws. Prior to
the CFPB, non-depository institutions offering consumers similar financial
products were not subject to the same scrutiny. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (2014). The
CFPB refers to "banks, saving associations, and credit unions" as either
"depository institutions" or "banks." In contrast, the agency refers to other
companies that provide consumer financial products or services, but are not
affiliates of large depository institutions, as either "non-depository institutions"
FIN.
See
CONSUMER
or
"nonbanks."
PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS (Winter
2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401-cfpb-supervisory-highlightswinter-2013.pdf. During my time at the CFPB, the terms "banks" and
"nonbanks" were used more often, and thus, I use them throughout this paper.
Does Agency Structure Affect Agency
Romano,
10 Roberta

Decisionmaking: Implications of the CFPB's Design for Administrative
Guidance, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (2019).
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executive branch agency-would function better." By contrast,
this Article explains that a commission (like the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation or the Securities and Exchange
Commission) would better achieve the objectives of Title X of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I recounts the events
leading up to the Great Recession, providing context for why the
government embraced a law professor's idea for a new agency.
Part II explains how this agency's institutional design, as well as
its scope of authority, make it unlike any other independent
regulatory body. Part III details how Congress' attempt to insulate
the Bureau from partisan politics had the perverse effect of making
it even more political. Part IV argues that keeping the agency's
independence is critical for consumer welfare and recommends a
solution that would reduce the partisan political stakes
surrounding the Bureau: Congress should restructure the agency
to a bipartisan commission where members serve staggered terms
and are removable only for cause. Under this proposal, the CFPB
retains a beneficial level of independence from the executive and
legislative branches, and at the same time, its structure would be
more constitutionally well-established.
Most importantly,
Congress would give industry a more predictable regulatory
landscape that supports consumer-friendly innovation.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE NEW
INDEPENDENT AGENCY
Economists were bewildered that the country's worst
recession since the Great Depression stemmed from the housing
marketl2 when, for decades, owning a home was a reliably "solid
investment."" In the early 2000s, consumers seized the opportunity
to own homes when historically low interest rates made affordable
SId. at 3 3 1.
Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y.
. 2008),
23,
(Oct.
TIMES
("[A]
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html
humbled Mr. Greenspan admitted that he had put too much faith in the selfcorrecting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive
power of wanton mortgage lending.").
13 Anthony Depalma, In the Nation; Why OwningA Home is the American
11,
1988),
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
Dream,
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/11/realestate/in-the-nation-why-owning-ahome-is-the-american-dream.html (explaining that the federal government's tax
policies have in part facilitated home ownership).
1
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monthly mortgage payments possible. 14 Even before this, mortgage
credit had expanded to include "subprime borrowers" who were
considered more likely to default on their loans."5 Many creditors
were willing to make these high-risk, subprime mortgages without
worrying about borrowers' creditworthiness because they could
repackage the loans into asset-backed securities and sell them to
Wall Street.1 6 The relaxed underwriting standards contributed to
14 See Krishna Guha, A Global Outlook, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007),
https://www.ft.com/content/976b7442-6486-1 ldc-90ea-0000779fd2ac
(describing interview of former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, in
which he explains that the housing bubble was "fundamentally engendered by
the decline in real long-term interest rates"). For a comprehensive discussion
about how the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve affected the housing
boom, see John B. Taylor, Remarks prepared for the "Causes" Session
"Workshop Series on the 2008 Financial Crisis: Causes, The Panic, The
19,
2018),
(Oct.
Lessons"
Recession,
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/govt-as_causeofcrisi
s-areassement_10.pdf.
" "Borrowers in the subprime market are deemed to be at higher risk of
defaulting on their loans based on the underwriting standards adopted by
individual lenders and financial factors such as prior credit history,
bankruptcies, income, work history, and related characteristics." LARRY
KIRSCH & GREGORY D. SQUIRES, MELTDOWN: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,

CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND THE ROAD FORWARD 2 (2017). To be clear,

subprime lending was not a result of the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"),
passed in 1977 to promote universal homeownership by encouraging banks to
lend to individuals who were formerly ineligible. Because the CRA applies only
to banks, it cannot be responsible for the "overwhelming proportion of subprime
loans [that] were issued through non-banking entities." Eamonn K. Moran, Wall
Street Meets Main Street Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 27 (2009). The Federal Reserve also concluded that the "CRA
was not a significant contributor to the financial crisis." Neil Bhutta & Daniel
Ringo, Assessing the Community Reinvestment Act's Role in the Financial
Crisis, FEDS NOTES. WASHINGTON: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
2015),
(May
26,
RESERVE
SYSTEM
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2 015/assessingthe-community-reinvestment-acts-role-in-the-financial-crisis-20150526.html
("[E]mpirical research, by and large, also finds little connection between the
CRA-related activities of banks and the expansion 6f risky or subprime
mortgage lending.").
16 See John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RESERVE HISTORY
2013),
22,
(Nov.
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime-mortgage-crisis
("[H]igh-risk mortgages became available from lenders who funded mortgages
by repackaging them into pools that were sold to investors."); Jim Zarroli, Rise
and Fall of Subprime Lenders Began on Wall St., NPR (Mar. 30, 2007),
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the growth of "predatory lending."" Unscrupulous lenders offered
"no doc,"" "negative amortization,"" and "teaser rate"20 mortgages
to people who could not afford them or who "weren't savvy
enough to turn them down."2 ' Individuals who previously would
not have qualified for mortgages became homeowners.2 2 Notably,
consumer advocates were not alone in their concerns about the
housing market.2 3 While some government officials were alarmed
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9248739
(explaining
that mortgage companies stopped lending their own money when "warehouse
lending by Wall Street firms" became available through mortgaged-backed
securities).
17 Kat Aaron, PredatoryLending: A Decade of Warning, CENTER FOR
PUBLIC
INTEGRITY
(May
6,
2009),
https://publicintegrity.org/business/predatory-lending-a-decade-of-warnings.
18 Lenders did not require borrowers to provide documentation proving
their ability to repay. Julia Kagan, No Documentation Mortgage (No Doc),
INVESTOPEDIA
(June
17,
2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nodocmortgage.asp. Approximately 50
percent of all subprime borrowers in 2005 and 2006 provided little or no
documentation of their income. Aaron, supranote 17.
1
With negative amortization loans, the borrowers' principal owed
increases over time because the monthly payments are less than the monthly
interest owed. Will Kenton, Negatively Amortizing Loan, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/negativelyamortizingloan.asp.
20 Often, lenders encouraged teaser rate loans and reassured borrowers that
because home prices were on the rise, they could maintain the low monthly
payments by simply refinancing once the higher rate took effect. See Julia
Kagan,
Teaser
Rate,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr.
2,
2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/teaserrate.asp.
21 Zarroli, supra
note 16.
22 This increased access to credit also spurred housing
demand, further
contributing to the upward pressure on home values. Katalina M. Bianco, The
Subprime Lending Crisis:Causes andEffects of the MortgageMeltdown, CCH
FED.

BANKING

LAW

REPORTER

6

(2008),.

https://business.cch.com/images/banner/subprime.pdf. In fact, from 1997 to
2006, nominal housing prices increased 188 percent. Adam J. Levitin & Susan
M. Wachter, Explainingthe HousingBubble, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR.
http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/wp3
(Aug.
31,
2010),
content/uploads/2017/03/689.pdf. However, due to fears that the rapid increase
in home values represented a housing bubble, from 2004 to 2006, the Federal
Reserve tried to slow down the growth of housing prices, adjusting interest rates
17 times from 1 percent to eventually 5.25 percent. Bianco at 5.
23 Aaron, supra note 17 ("As the subprime lending industry grew, and
accounts of abusive practices mounted, advocates, borrowers, lawyers, and even
some lenders clamored for a legislative or regulatory response to what was
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by Wall Street's role, banking regulators were convinced that
tougher enforcement of existing laws and industry self-regulation
would suffice.24
In August 2006, falling home prices meant that outstanding
debt began to exceed home values. 25 Borrowers who could no
longer afford their mortgages faced a difficult choice: either wait
for their lender to foreclose or walk away from their homes and
default on their mortgages.2 6 With foreclosures on the rise, home
prices declined further, resulting in more homes going
"underwater," perpetuating the cycle of increasing levels of
mortgage defaults and families losing their homes.2 7 In August
2007, American International Group ("AIG"), one of the world's
largest insurance companies, warned that mortgage defaults were
not limited to the subprime sector. 2 8 By mid-December, Wall Street
emerging as a crisis.").
24 Then-Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal
Trade Commission, Jodie Bernstein, believed that Wall Street's role was
"outrageous" and that "they're bundling these things up and then nobody has
responsibility for them" because "[t]hey're just passing them on." However, she
recognized that she did not have much influence compared to Greenspan, who
had little interest in consumer regulation. In an October 2008 congressional
testimony, Greenspan conceded a "flaw" in his ideology, "Those of us who have
looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's [sic]
equity, myself especially, are in a state of shocked disbelief." Id.
25 See Bianco, supra note 22, at 5, 19.
26 As long as housing prices were on the rise, when homeowners could not
meet their monthly payments, they could sell their homes and pay off their
mortgages or borrow more against the equity in their home to cover their
payments. MAJORITY STAFF OF JOINT EcoN. COMM., 110TH CONG., REP. AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS 2-3 (2007),
https://www.jec.senate.gov/publicl-cache/files/148eaf7c-ee62-42fO-b215006db6al 1d65/octobersubprimereport.pdf.
27 By May 2007, foreclosures were up 90 percent from the previous year.
JOINT EcON. COMM., 110TH CONG., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET CRISIS

2008),
(July
23
TIMELINE
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4cdd7384-dbf6-40e6-adbc[hereinafter
789f69131903/subprimetimelineupdate0710080000000.pdf
TIMELINE]. In July 2007, the figure jumped to 93 percent year over year. Id at
20. That -same month, credit rating agencies downgraded the subprime
mortgage-backed securities that had been sold to investors. Id. at 23. Soon
thereafter, Bear Stearns announced losses of over $1.4 billion in its two hedge
funds that invested in the subprime market. Id. at 22.
28 Id. at 21. For a discussion about AIG's role in the mortgage crisis, see
Carrick Mollenkam et al., BehindAIG's Fall, Risk Models Failedto PassReal2008),
31,
(Oct.
J.
ST.
WALL
Tes4
World
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had lost more than $40 billion from the mortgage crisis. 2 9 No one
realized it then, but the economy had entered the "Great
Recession. "3
In January 2008, stock markets around the world tumbled
as investors feared that the mortgage crisis would spread to the
international financial system."' Soon, the U.S. government had no
choice but to intercede.3 2 Bear Stearns, the fifth largest investment
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122538449722784635. Also during August
2007, foreclosures were up 36 percent from the prior month and 115 percent
from the prior year. TIMELINE, supranote 27, at 18. In October 2007, the former
chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association predicted that "a half million
mortgage borrowers each year for the next few years risk foreclosure." Id. at 14.
29 Landon Thomas Jr, $9.4 Billion Write-Down at Morgan Stanley, N.Y.
TIMES:
BUSINESS
DAY
(Dec.
20,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/business/20wall.html.
' Kevin J. Lansing, Gauging the Impact of the Great Recession, EcoN.
RESEARCH DEPT. OF THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (July 11, 2011),

https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economicletter/2011/july/impact-great-recession/ ("The 'Great Recession,' which started
in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, was the most severe economic
contraction since 1947 as measured by the peak-to-trough decline in real GDP.").
"' Bianco, supra note 22, at 19 ("Stock prices fell more than 7 percent in
Germany and India, 5.5 percent in Britain, 5.1 percent in China and 3.9 percent
in Japan. Many countries reported their worst market declines since Sept. 11,
2001.").

Initially, the Bush administration was unwilling to interfere. In March
2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke testified at a congressional Joint
Economic Committee hearing, "[T]he turmoil in the subprime mortgage market
has created severe financial problems for many individuals and families.... At
this juncture, however, the impact on the broader economy and financial
markets of the problems in the subprime market seems likely to be contained."
The Economic Outlook BeforeJoint Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. (Mar. 28, 2007)
(testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors). The following month, when Senate Democrats called for the
government's intervention to prevent more home foreclosures, the Bush
administration not only expressed reluctance, but appeared to place the blame
on home owners. White House Spokesman Tony Fratto was quoted as saying,
"[I]ndividuals need to make smart decisions in taking on debt, and there has to
be some responsibility for making those decisions." Diana Olick, CNBC's Olick:
Lawmakers Seek Help for Homeowners in Trouble, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2010),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/18092014. The administration was concerned that
government involvement "would only encourage risky behavior." Id. In August
2007, those sentiments were echoed in a speech by Bernanke, "It is not the
responsibility of the Federal Reserve-nor would it be appropriate-to protect
lenders and investors from the consequences of their financial decisions."
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Speech at
32
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bank in the country, was on the brink of failing partly because two
of its hedge funds had heavily invested in subprime mortgages.
In March 2008, the government incentivized JP Morgan Chase to
acquire Bear Stearns by guaranteeing its bad loans.3 4 The
government again intervened in September 2008, when it took
over $5 trillion in mortgages.3 5 However, it refused to bail outseemingly arbitrarily-Lehman Brothers, an even larger
investment bank," when it could not meet its debt obligations or
find a buyer. On September 15, when Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy it "shook Wall Street to its core" with retirement plans
and other investment funds losing approximately $700 billion. 8
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Economic Symposium, Jackson
Hole, Wyoming on Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy (Aug. 31,
2007),

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2007083 1a.htm.
1 See Jeff Pruzan, Timeline: Bear Stearns'yearof turmoil, FIN. TIMES
https://www.ft.com/content/d7936764-f ld5-1 ldc-9b4517,
2008),
(Mar.
0000779fd2ac.
34 Bear Stearns Gets Bailout From the Federal Reserve, CNBC (last
updated Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/23630235 ("The Fed is taking
all the risk in this arrangement.

. . . They are exposing themselves to a

nonmember institution which is highly unusual, if not unprecedented. They
could have (made the loan) directly, but they chose not to."); Andrew Ross
Sorkin, JPMorgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17,
(Bear
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html
2008),
Stearns' share price was $170 a year ago).
3 David Ellis, US. seizes Fannie and Freddie, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7,
2008), https://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fanniefreddie/. The
Treasury Department declared that the two government-sponsored mortgage
companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were insolvent, placing them under
the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Financial Agency, providing them
up to $200 billion to keep them from failing. Id.
6 For a discussion explaining why the government allowed Lehman
Brothers to fail, see Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation byDeal:
The Government's Response to the FinancialCrisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463,
491-94 (2009); see also Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis:An Inside View,
BROOKINGS

PAPERS

ON

EcON.

ACTIVITY

1,

39-40

(Spring

2009),

https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2009/03/2009abpeaswagel.pdf.
" Morning Edition, Lehman Brothers Scrambles To FindA Buyer, NPR
2008),
12,
(Sept.
For an
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=94545642.
account of companies that had considered taking over Lehman Brothers, see
generally ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL 187-351 (2009).
" Matt Egan, Lehman Brothers: When the FinancialCrisis Spun Out of
2008),
(Sept.
14,
CNN
BUSINESS
Control,
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Crisis Inquiry Commission later concluded that
collapsed, "the financial crisis reached cataclysmic
setting the stage for "unprecedented government
the financial market." 40
A. Roots in Academia

Before Elizabeth Warren became a U.S. Senator from
Massachusetts running for president, she was a Harvard Law
professor who had spent years as a consumer advocate.4 1 In the
summer of 2007-when it was increasingly apparent to consumer
advocates that the mortgage market was in crisis, but well before
federal officials realized that it could bring the entire financial
system to a grinding halt4 2-then-Professor Warren argued that
predatory lending in the subprime mortgage market underscored
the need to rethink financial regulation. In her article, "Unsafe at
Any Rate," she explained that there ought to be a "Financial
Product Safety Commission," similar to the Consumer Product
Safety Commission ("CPSC"):
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five
chance of bursting into flames and burning down your
house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/30/investing/lehman-brothers-2008crisis/index.html.
39

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 343 (2011). For a discussion

about the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's role and a critique of its report,
see Andrew H. Hartlage, 'Never Again, "Again: A FunctionalExamination of
the FinancialCrisisInquiry Commission, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (2013).
40 Anj an V. Thankor, Leverage, System Risk and FinancialSystem Health:
How Do We Develop a Healthy Financial System?, in GOVERNANCE,

REGULATION AND BANK STABILITY 9, 9 (T. Lindblom, et al. eds., 2014).
41 Helaine Olen, Elizabeth Warren: From Consumer Advocate to United
States
Senator,
FORBES
(Nov.
6,
2012),
https://www.forbes.comlsites/helaineolen/2012/11/06/elizabeth-warren-fromconsumer-advocate-to-united-states-senator/#695a5 54 7f1 ab.
42 In a June 2007 speech, at the International Monetary Conference,
Bernanke touted, "[F]undamental factors-including solid growth in incomes
and relatively low mortgage rates-should ultimately support the demand for
housing, and at this point, the troubles in the subprime sector seem unlikely to
seriously spill over to the broader economy or the financial system." Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Speech to the 2007
International Monetary Conference, Cape Town, South Africa (via satellite) on
the Housing
Market and Subprime
Lending
(June
5, 2007),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070605a.htm.
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with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of
putting the family out on the street-and the mortgage
won't even carry a disclosure of that fact to the
homeowner.4 3
In her view, if "[n]early every product sold in America has passed
basic safety regulations well in advance of reaching store shelves,"
then financial products should also be reviewed for safety to make
sure that they "themselves don't become the source of the
trouble." 44
To be fair, well before the financial crisis hit, more than a
dozen consumer financial protection statutes already existed. The
responsibility for enforcing these statutes was shared among no
fewer than seven regulators-the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Federal Reserve"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the
National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"), the Office of
Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD")-with each having authority over
certain types of financial entities.4 5
Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF
(Summer 2007), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-atany-rate! [hereinafter Unsafe at Any Rate].
43

IDEAS,
44

Id.

While the FTC is a consumer protection agency, it does not oversee
banks, and thus, has a limited role in financial markets. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2) ("The
[FTC] is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions ... from using unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce."). Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal
Reserve mainly oversaw bank holding companies, state member banks, and
foreign banks operating in the United States. The OCC was responsible for
national banks and federal branches of foreign banks. The FDIC was
responsible for federally-insured depository institutions, including state banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve. The NCUA oversaw federallychartered or insured credit unions. The OTS was responsible for savings
associations and savings and loan holding companies. WALTER W. EUBANKS,
45

FEDERAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
RESEARCH SERV., RL33036,
CONG.
REGULATORY CONSOLIDATION: AN OVERVIEW 2 (July 10, 2008). With the

enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress eliminated the OTS, transferring
its responsibilities: The Federal Reserve took over savings and loan holding
companies; the OCC gained federally chartered thrift institutions; and the FDIC
became in charge of state-chartered thrift institutions. MARC LABONTE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE
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Depending on how a depository institution structured itself,
it could "shop for the regulator [it] thought most congenial."4 6 For
example, a national bank could become a savings and loan
association, thereby changing its primary regulator from the OCC,
which was known to be tough, to the OTS, "which was viewed as
a regulator that was particularly tolerant." 47 Put another way, it
was " a race to the bottom" as the responsibility for enforcing
consumer protection statutes turned on the financial institution's
chosen charter rather than on the type of financial product
offered.4 8
Warren believed that this resulted in financial products
being "regulated by a tattered patchwork of federal and state
laws."4 9 She reported that in 2005, 23 percent of subprime
mortgages were issued by thrifts or banks (resulting in oversight
by the OTS, the OCC, or the FDIC); another 25 percent were
issued by bank holding companies (resulting in oversight by the
Federal Reserve); and the remaining 52 percent were not federally
regulated at all.5 o To her, this provided "a stunning example of the
U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 8 (Aug. 17, 2017).
46 ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: How AMERICA'S ESSENTIAL

INSTITUTION WORKS, AND How IT DOESN'T 192 (2013). The

OCC and the

OTS charged fees to financial institutions they regulated, while the Federal
Reserve and the FDIC did not, providing another factor for choosing a
regulator. Id. at 192-93.
47 Id. at 193. Because a number of financial institutions under OTS
supervision had failed (e.g., IndyMac, Countrywide, and Washington Mutual)
or would have failed without government intervention (e.g., AIG), critics

believed "[i]t deserve[d] to be shuttered." Robert Cyran, The Downfall of a
Regulator,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/business/09views.html. For a discussion
detailing the bipartisan investigation into OTS' failures, see U.S. SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIs: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 161-239

(Comm.
Print
2011),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/medialdoc/FinancialCrisis/FinancialCrisis
Report.pdf?attempt=2 [hereinafter SENATE INVESTIGATIONS REPORT].
48 U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 8

(2009),

https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/finalreport-web.pdf

[hereinafter FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM] ("[F]inancial institutions will
tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a
race to the bottom and intensifying systemic risk.").
49

so

Unsafe at Any Rate, supra note 43.
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, nonbanks such as stand-alone mortgage

brokers and nonbank finance companies were not subject to federal supervision.
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resulting fractured oversight.""
To make matters worse, these prudential regulators were
focused on the safety and soundness of the banking system rather
than protecting consumers.5 2 Their central mission was to evaluate
risk management and risk mitigation by analyzing the strength of
a bank's balance sheet. Georgetown Law Professor Adam Levitin
highlighted this inherent conflict of interest:
Safety-and-soundness ultimately means profitability,
because only profitable financial institutions can be safe
and sound. Unfair, deceptive and abusive practices,
however, can be highly profitable; that is the only reason
to engage in them. Placing the two missions together in a
single agency ensures that one will trump the other, and
historically consumer protection has not won out, except
when the most egregious practices are at stake."
Even more troubling was the regulators' apparent disregard for
the consumer safety of its regulated entities' financial products.
For example, the Federal Reserve had authority over the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act since its enactment in
1994,54 but it had long resisted implementing key statutory
provisions that could have prevented predatory lending. 5 In June
See Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REv.
1611, 1616-18 (2015).
s1 Unsafe at Any Rate, supra note 43.
52 See LABONTE, supra note 45, at 5. The prudential regulators are the
Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, the NCUA, and the OTS (before it was
eliminated under the Dodd-Frank Act). Prudential regulators are not funded
through congressional appropriations. See HOGUE, ET AL., infra note 108, at 27.
5 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer FinancialProtectionAgency, 28-OCT
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, Oct. 2009, at 66.
54 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103325, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994).
" To be clear, the Federal Reserve issued regulations implementing certain
parts of the statutory program well before the Great Recession. However, the
Federal Reserve declined to issue any regulations implementing the provision of
the statute that could have prohibited predatory lending. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1639(l)(2) (2009) ("The Board, by regulation or order, shall prohibit acts or
practices in connection with (A) mortgage loans that the Board finds to be
unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade the provisions of this section; and (B)
refinancing of mortgage loans that the Board finds to be associated with abusive
lending practices, or that are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower."). For
a discussion outlining the Federal Reserve's refusal to issue regulations
implementing this provision, see Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systematic Risk
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2008, several months into the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve
issued rules protecting consumers from unfair, abusive, or
deceptive lending and servicing practices.s6 By then, millions of
Americans had already lost their homes, were in mortgage default,
or at risk of defaulting. The mortgage crisis demonstrated that
because no single agency focused on the consumer safety of
financial products, consumer protection was often overlooked."
B. Political Will and Public Opinion
Seasoned politicians knew that only a crisis could turn thenProfessor Warren's "pipe dream"" into reality. Shortly after the
November 2008 elections, then-President-Elect Obama's new
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel candidly advised top CEOs, "You
never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that
- it's an opportunity to do things you think you could not do
before."" Within five months of his inauguration, President
Obama unabashedly used the financial crisis to introduce an 88page white paper to modernize the financial regulatory system:6 0
We did not choose how this crisis began, but we do have
a choice in the legacy this crisis leaves behind. So today
my administration is proposing a sweeping overhaul of
Through Securitization: The Result of DeregulationandRegulatory Failure,41
L. REv. 1327 (2009).
6 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board issues
final rule amending home mortgage provisions of Regulation Z (Truth in
Lending)
(July 14,
2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20080714a.htm.
" Adam J. Levitih, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An
Introduction, 32 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 330 ("Prior to the CFPB,
consumer financial protection regulation was divided among multiple federal
CONN.

and state agencies.

. . .

[I]t made consumer protection an orphan mission that

tended to 'fall between the cracks' because no agency had an exclusive role of
consumer protection in financial services.").
58 ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING CHANCE 131 (2014) ("My article
proposing this new agency was published in 2007.... At the time, a consumer
financial protection bureau seemed like a pipe dream. George W. Bush was still
president, and the Republican leadership was still talking about de-regulation,
not stronger regulation.").
* Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunityfor Obama, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21,
2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271; see also James
Albee, Rahm EmanuelNeverLetA Good Crisis Go To Waste, YouTUBE (Mar.
20, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXwjHKEejFc.
60 FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supranote 48.
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the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a
scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great
Depression."1
Much to Warren's excitement,6 2 Obama's proposal included her
call for an agency dedicated solely to consumer welfare:
[W]e're proposing a new and powerful agency charged
with one-just one job: looking out for ordinary
consumers.... This agency will have the power to set
standards so that companies compete by offering
innovative products that consumers actually want and
actually understand. Consumers will be provided
information that is simple, transparent, and accurate.
You'll be able to compare products and see what's best
for you. The most unfair practices will be banned....
And enforcement will be the rule, not the exception.6 3
Unsurprisingly, the proposed agency enjoyed broad public
support.6 4 In the past 18 months, Americans experienced the worst
economic decline since the Great Depression.6 s The economy lost
roughly 8.7 million jobs,6 6 the unemployment rate more than
doubled to 10 percent, 67 and millions of Americans lost their
61 Administration of Barack Obama, 2009, Gov'T PUBLISHING
OFFICE at
844 (2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2009-bookl/pdf/PPP2009-bookl-doc-pg843-2.pdf [hereinafter GPO.
62 WARREN, supra note 58, at 146 ("At the time, I was too buzzed with
excitement to marvel at how truly astonishing this was. I'd heard rumors that
some of the president's top financial advisors were unenthusiastic about the
concept for the new agency.... So where had the support come from? . .. As I
would later learn, [Obama] believed passionately that the White House needed
to support a reform measure that would help regular people, and he saw the
agency as the best way to do that.").
63 GPO, supra note 61, at 844.
64 KAISER, supra note 46, at
377.
6 Marilyn Geewax, Did The GreatRecession BringBack The 1930s?, NPR
(July 11, 2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/did-the-greatrecession-bring-back-the-1930s.
66 Stephanie Hugie Barello, Consumer Spending and US. Employment
from the 2007-2009 Recession Through 2022, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW (Oct.
2014), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/consumer-spending-and-usemployment-from-the-recession-through-2022.htm.
67 John Weinberg, The GreatRecession and its Aftermath, FED. RESERVE
HISTORY
(Nov.
22,
2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-and-its-aftermat
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homes. Despite the series of 2008 government bailouts,68 the lives
of ordinary Americans seemingly failed to improve. To add insult
to injury, AIG had announced recently that it would provide
executive bonuses of $165 million, despite receiving the largest
taxpayer bailout. 69 Polls reflected what every politician already
knew: Americans were furious, and they expected stricter
regulations.7 0
The Obama administration's proposal, however, went far
beyond regulating the mortgage market. It addressed nearly every
aspect of the consumer financial markets." In fact, the
administration sought a comprehensive reform of the entire
financial sector,7 2 reflecting the belief that no one single factor
caused the Great Recession."
In March 2008, the Federal Reserve provided a $30 billion credit line to
ensure that JP Morgan Chase would purchase Bear Stearns. Jesse Nanin
Krista Kjellman Schmidt, History of US Gov't Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (Sept.
18, 2008), https://www.propublica.org/article/government-bailouts. In early
September 2008, the government "essentially nationalized" mortgage companies
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id. One week later, the government loaned AIG
$85 billion. Id. Later that month, the auto industry received $25 billion in loans.
Id. In October 2008, Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP"), giving the Treasury Department $700 billion to shore up financial
institutions. Id. Over the course of October and November 2008, the
government would bail out AIG three more times, and total cost reached $182
billion, some of which came from TARP. Kimberly Amadeo, 2008 Financial
2019),
11,
May
updated
(last
BALANCE
Crisis,
https://www.thebalance.com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679.
69 Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.iG. Planning Huge Bonuses
After $170
Billion Bailou4
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
14,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html.
70 KAISER, supra note 46, at 378.
&

68

" FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 48, at 57 ("We propose

that the [agency's] jurisdiction should cover consumer financial services and
products such as credit, savings and payment products and related services, as
well as the institutions that issue, provide, or service these products and provide
services to the entities that provide the financial products.").
72 For example, before the Dodd-Frank Act, there were no regulations on
structured finance products, such as synthetic collateralized debt obligations,
which had played a role in exacerbating the mortgage crisis. See BAIRD WEBEL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 4 (2017)

("The [Dodd-Frank Act] included provisions that affected virtually every
financial market and that amended existing or granted new authority and
responsibility to nearly every federal financial regulatory agency.").
7 In
April 2011, a congressional investigation confirmed the
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II. THE NEW AGENCY IS UNLIKE ANY OTHER
The White House's outline of reforms eventually served as
the "template" for drafting the legislative language in both
Barney Frank (D-MA),
chambers.7 4 Then-Representative
Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and thenSenator Chris Dodd (D-CT), Chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee, agreed with Obama that the new agency would have
independence and accountability. Yet, they agreed on only two
agency features: it would not be subject to congressional
appropriations and its leadership would be removable only for
cause. On everything else, the administration, Frank, and Dodd
diverged.
*

The White House proposed that the new agency would
have a "stable funding stream, which could come in part
from fees assessed on entities and transactions across the
financial sector." There would be "a Director and a Board,"
where the . Board would "represent a diverse set of
viewpoints and experiences" and "[a]t least one seat on the
Board should be reserved for the head of a prudential
regulator.""s

*

House bill H.R. 4173 established that funding would come
from fees as well as from the Federal Reserve." The new
agency would be led initially by a single director removable
only for cause and then by a multi-member, bipartisan
commission three and one-half years after the bill was
enacted."

administration's belief with the release of a bipartisan Senate Committee
Report. See SENATE INVESTIGATIONS REPORT, supra note 47 (identifying four
causative factors: high risk lending, regulatory failure, inflated credit ratings,
and investment bank abuses).
74 KAISER, supranote 46, at 91.
7

FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM,

supranote 48, at 58.

The House passed H.R. 4173 on December 11, 2009. H.R. 4173
§ 4111(a)(1) at 861-62 (describing how agency would be funded based on 10
percent of Federal Reserve's expenses); § 4111(b) at 862-69 (describing how
agency would be funded based on fees and assessments), available at
https://www.congress.gov/1 11/bills/hr4 173/BILLS-11 1hr4173eh.pdf.
" H.R. 4173 § 4101(b) at 822 (describing the initial and subsequent
structure of the agency); § 4102(b)(5) at 824 ("The Director may be removed
available at
only for cause."),
term
the
end of a
before
https://www.congress.gov/111/bills/hr4173/BILLS-11lhr4173eh.pdf.
76
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Senate bill S. 3127 provided that funding would come only
from the Federal Reserve." The new agency structure
would be led by a single director removable only for cause,
but there would be no Board and the agency's powers
would never transition to a commission.79 The new agency
would be independent, but it would fall under the Federal
Reserve instead of being a free-standing agency. 0

Both bills proposed unconventional agency structures. The
disparity between the House and Senate bills may have reflected
how differently the two chambers viewed independence and
accountability, or maybe it was the result of each chamber having
a different legislative drafting process. Perhaps, it was simply
happenstance. Frank "never worried about pleasing Republicans,"
and thus, they had little input in the House bill. In contrast, Dodd
wanted a bipartisan reform bill but was rebuffed by his
Republican counterparts. 82 Ironically, his agency design-which
For procedural reasons, the Senate passed an amended H.R. 4173 on May
20, 2010. The provisions pertaining to the agency's leadership and
accountability structure in amended H.R. 4173 and S. 3127 are identical.
Document: Comparing Relevant Sections of Amended H.R. 4173 and S. 3127
(on file with author). Amended H.R. 4173 § 1017(a) at 1240-41 (describing that
the Director would request necessary funding from the Federal Reserve
available
at
a
cap),
pursuant
to
https://www.congress.gov/111 /bills/hr4 173/BILLS-111 hr41 73eas.pdf.
" Amended H.R. 4173 § 1011(b)(1) at 1222 ("There is established the
position of the Director, who shall serve as the head of the Bureau."); § 1011(c)(3)
at 1223 ("The President may remove the Director for inefficiency, neglect of
available
at
office."),
in
malfeasance
duty,
or
https://www.congress.gov/1 1 1/bills/hr4173/BILLS-11lhr4173eas.pdf.
80 See Amended H.R. 4173 § 1011(a) at 1222 ("There is established in the
Federal Reserve System, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.");
§ 1012(c) at 1225 (explaining the agency's autonomy from the Federal Reserve),
https://www.congress.gov/1 11/bills/hr4173/BILLSat
available
11lhr4l73eas.pdf.
81 KAISER, supranote 46, at 373.
82 Despite having only thirty-nine votes in the Senate, Senator Richard
Shelby (R-AL), then-ranking Republican on the Senate Banking Committee,
refused to continue negotiating unless Dodd took "the independent consumer
agency off the table." This was a "nonstarter" when Democrats controlled both
the White House and Congress, by substantial margins. KAISER, supra note 46,
at 191. For a discussion about the Democratic party's success in the 2006 and
2008 elections, see Stuart Rothenberg, Is 2008 a RealigningElection?Numbers
2008),
Offer Some
Clues, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Nov. 11,
78
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did include a few Republican-inspired features-was much
tougher than the House version or the White House's proposal.
Because the GOP leadership ordered its members to refrain from
offering any amendments, Dodd's bill was reported out of
committee without a substantive debate or markup." Frank called
for a conference committee with televised proceedings (even
though that was no longer the norm) and Dodd had the Senate
version serve as the "base text" for the conference.8 s During the
committee proceedings, no one offered any changes to the Senate's
structural or accountability design for the new agency.8 6
House Republicans never had a chance at influencing
financial reform while Senate Republicans squandered whatever
opportunity they had to rein in Democrats' plans for a regulatory
overhaul. In fairness, the GOP likely was uninterested in the
details surrounding the structure when it was entirely opposed to
even creating a new agency." Having another federal regulatory
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/1 1/is2008ajrealigningelecti
on.html ("[I]n the past two elections, Democrats gained at least a dozen Senate
seats and at least 50 House seats, taking total control of Congress.").
8
During negotiations with Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), Dodd outlined the
four features the agency should have: (1) an independent director or chairman
nominated by the president, confirmed by the Senate; (2) a dedicated source of
revenue not subject to the annual congressional appropriation process; (3)
rulemaking authority over entities that provide consumer credit; and (4)
enforcement authority over nonbanks. The idea that the CFPB would be an
independent division with the Federal Reserve originated with Corker. KAISER,
supra note 46, at 250. Originally, Frank had disliked Corker's idea but later
recognized it as "clever" because it "gave the Fed no authority over the
independent bureau" and "[i]ts director, appointed by the president, would have
total freedom of action, and more power than the heads of nearly all other
regulatory agencies, most of which were run by bipartisan boards." Id. at 343.
84 Corker expressed his amazement, "It is pretty unbelievable that after two
years of hearings on arguably the biggest issue facing our panel in decades the
[Senate Banking] committee has passed a 1,300-page bill in a twenty-oneminute, partisan markup. I don't know how you can call that anything but
dysfunctional." Id. at 262. As a strategic move, the GOP leadership had decided
"to let Dodd report his bill out of committee on a party-line vote, without making
any attempt to improve it with amendments." Id. at 258.
85 Id
at 331-33.
86 During the proceedings there were countless amendments to the entire
1300-page legislation. For a more detailed discussion about the negotiations
surrounding other major issues, such as the Volcker rule, see KAISER, supranote
46, at 333-58.
87 E.g., 156 CONG. REC. H2927-09, H2930 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Scott Garrett (R-NJ)) ("[T]hey want to create as a brand new
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body was antithetical to its ideological views about limited
government."
Republicans argued that while they were against a new
agency, they too supported consumer protection." House
Republicans introduced a reform bill,9 o but its proposed consumer
safety measures were largely limited to resolving consumer
complaints against certain banks, conducting consumer testing
prior to issuing rules, and performing a cost benefit analysis on
earlier regulations," none of which addressed the practices leading
to the mortgage crisis. With the partisan House bill dead on
arrival9 2 and GOP leadership discouraging its members from
working with Dodd, Congress was left to vote on legislation
establishing a regulatory body that would be less accountable to

agency here in Washington, as if we don't have enough agencies already in
Washington."); 155 CONG. REC. H14480-02, H14482 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Pete Sessions (R-TX)) ("The [CFPB] is a classic example of
the government's overstepping its authority into the free enterprise system
simply to make government bigger and to further control the free enterprise
system and free market.").
"8 President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981)
(transcript available at http://avalon.1aw.yale.edu/2 0thcentury/reagan 1.asp)
("Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem.").
Republicans "minimize the role of the federal government" whereas Democrats
"promote government as a defender of the weak and provider of opportunity."
KAISER, supranote 46, at 383-84.
89 156 CONG. REc. S5870-02, S5884 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ)) ("All of us here support the concept of consumer protection,
so let's don't get off on a tangent of being for or against consumer protection.
We all support that. The question is, How do you do it? Safeguards can be
strengthened without creating a new regulatory bureaucracy with the powers
that exist in this bill and all of the untoward ramifications that result."); 156
CONG. REC. S5891 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg (RNH)) ("Consumer protection is critical. We all agree to that.").
" Representative Spencer Bachus (R-AL), then Ranking Member of the
House Financial Services Committee, introduced the Republican regulatory
reform plan. Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, H.R.
3310, 111th Cong. (as introduced in House, July 23, 2009).
91 H.R. 3310 § 311. At the media event introducing the bill, the Republicans
summarized it as "no more bailouts." KAISER, supra note 46, at 125. No one
mentioned that the bailouts of 2008 originated from a Republican
administration or that a number of the bill's co-sponsors had also supported
those bailouts. Id.
92 The partisan bill was never scheduled for markup, and thus, never
debated in committee. See H.R. 3310.
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both political branches than any other existing agency."
By then, Democrats-even those who were initially wary
a
about new agency 94-made clear, that this was the very type of
regulator they wanted: an independent agency that would be more
politically-insulated from both branches. Representative Carolyn
Maloney (D-NY) announced, "For the first time, consumer
protection authority will be housed in one place. It will be
completely independent, with an independently appointed
director, an independent budget, and an autonomous rulemaking
authority.""
On July 21, 2010, after a Democrat-controlled Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a Democratic president signed it into law.96 It had
the support of only six Republicans, presaging the agency's
vulnerability to changes in political control.97

156 CONG. REc. S5891 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Judd
Gregg (R-NH)) ("It is totally independent of everybody else. It doesn't answer
to anyone except on a very limited and narrow way to the systemic risk council.
It is a single person with an $850 million unoversighted [sic] revenue stream with
no appropriations."); 156 Cong. Rec. S5879 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement
of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY)) ("[H]ere is a bill that fails to address the root
causes of the kind of crisis it is meant to prevent, that creates a vast new
unaccountable bureaucracy. . .").
94 KAISER, supranote 46, at 115-17.
9 156 CONG. REC. H5233-01, H5239 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of
Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)) (emphasis added).
96 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). There were nearly 200 legislative actions
leading up to the passage of the act. All Actions HR.4173 - 111th Congress
https://www.congress.gov/bill/1 11thCONGREss.Gov,
(2009-2010),
congress/house-bill/4173/all-actions?r= 19&overview=closed#tabs.
9
The Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4173, "Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009," passed the House, 237-192.
Representatives Joseph Cao (R-LA), Mike Castle (R-DE), and Walter Jones (RNC) were the only House Republicans who voted for it. Final Vote Results for
1

Roll Call 413, OFFICE OF THE CLERK U.S. HouSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (June

30, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll413.xml. It passed the
Senate, 60-39. Senators Scott Brown (R-MA), Susan Collins (R-ME), and.
Olympia Snowe (R-ME) were the only three to cross party lines. Roll Call Vote
1111, Congress - 2 "d Session, UNITED STATES SENATE (July 15, 2010, 2:29 PM),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-calllists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?c
ongress= 11 1&session=2 &vote=00208.
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A. Designingan UnconventionalAgency
On its face, Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act appeared to
accomplish exactly what the Democrats sought. Unlike most other
independent regulatory agencies, the CFPB is not led by a multimember, bipartisan commission. Instead, it is led by a single
director." But, unlike other single-headed agencies, there is far less
executive control because the CFPB's director can only be
removed by the president for cause. 9 Further, Congress too has
limited control as the agency's funding is not through the regular
appropriations process. Instead, it receives funding from the
Federal Reserve.10 Democrats set out to ensure the agency's
independence and they seemingly achieved that with the Bureau's
unconventional design.
Remarkably, there is no legally definitive set of
characteristics that describes independent agencies. In fact, the
U.S. Constitution makes no mention of them.1 0 1 The term
"independent agency" is statutorily defined only once, and even
then, the term is simply defined to mean a list of government
entities and "any other similar agency designated by statute as a
Federal independent regulatory agency or commission." 02
98 12 U.S.C. §5491(b)(1) (2010) ("There is established the position of the
Director, who shall serve as the head of the Bureau.").
'Id. § 549 1(c)(3) ("The President may remove the Director for inefficiency,

neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.").
100 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2010) ("[E]ach quarter.. .the Board of Governors shall
transfer to the Bureau from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve
System, the amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to
carry out the authorities of the Bureau under Federal consumer financial law.").
101 CL U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2 (The President "may require the opinion, in
writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments.").
102 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2019) (defining "independent regulatory agency" to
mean "the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Mine Enforcement
Safety and Health Review Commission, the National Labor Relations Board,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, the Postal Regulatory Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the
Office of Financial Research, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and any
other similar agency designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory
agency or commission.").
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Notably, this definition did not appear until the enactment of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 ("PRA").10 Yet, as early as the
1880s, Congress had created what has come to be recognized as the
first independent agency. 0 4
Since then, Congress has created other independent
agencies such as the Social Security Administration ("SSA"),105 the
Office of Special Counsel ("OSC"),0 6 the Federal Housing Finance
Agency ("FHFA"),o' the 0CC,0 the FDIC,10 9 the Commodity
103 The definition is found in a section of the PRA that directs the
coordination of federal information policy. See44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521.
104 When Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887,
it was placed under the Department of Interior and only later became an
independent agency as a "product of political negotiations responding to the
need for efficient regulation of the railroad industry." Marshall J. Breger & Gary
J. Edles, Establishedby Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent
FederalAgencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1115-16 (2000).
1os "There is hereby established, as an independent agency in the executive
branch of the Government, a Social Security Administration." 42 U.S.C. § 901(a)
(1994).
OSC's enabling statute is silent on independence. See
106 The
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified

as amended at 5 U.S.C.

§§ 1211-1219 (1999)). Congress, however, intended it to

be independent. 134 Cong. Rec. H9313-23, H9320 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Schroeder) ("As for the conduct of the Office of Special
Counsel, correction required precise provisions limiting the authority of the
Special Counsel. We made the office an independent agency to avoid any
possibility of undue influence."). Id. at H9323 (The Whistleblower Protection
Act "strengthens rights of civil service employees by. . .[e]stablishing the OSC as
an independent agency.") (statement of Rep. Gilman).
10" "There is established the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which shall
be an independent agency of the Federal Government." 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a)
(2008).
108 The OCC is located within the Department of Treasury. See National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2010) (the relevant sections relating to the Office
of Comptroller of Currency). Yet, it is considered an independent agency. See
HENRY B. HOGUE, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43391, INDEPENDENCE
OF FINANCIAL REGULATORS: STRUCTURE, FUNDING, AND OTHER ISSUES

7-8

(2017).
109 The FDIC's enabling statute is silent on independence. See Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-3lbb (1993). Nevertheless, it has long
been considered independent. Independence of Regulatory Agencies, 12 U.S.C.
§ 250 (defines FDIC as an independent agency); S. REP. No. 93-902, 93th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1974, as reprintedin1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 29 ("The purpose of this
section is to preserve and strengthen the independence of these agencies, which
were originally created by the Congress to be free of control by the executive
branch.
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Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"),10 the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC"),`n and the FTC.1 1 2 While they
have varying characteristics, all are "insulated to some extent from
Presidential control.""' In the last decade, two legal scholars
identified a set of seven agency characteristics and showed that,
depending on their combination, agencies fall along a spectrum
ranging from more independent to less.' 1 4 This Article modifies

no "There is hereby established, as an independent agency of the United
States Government, a Commodity Futures Trading Commission." 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(2)(A) (2015).
n' The SEC's enabling statute is silent on independence. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk. Nonetheless, courts have
considered the SEC independent. E.g., United States v. Baker, 912 F.3d 297,
308 (5th Cir. 2019) ("The SEC is an independent agency with its own litigating
authority."). Further, the agency has considered itself independent. In her
speech, "The SEC after the Financial Crisis: Protecting Investors, Preserving
Markets," then Chair Mary Jo White explained the importance of the agency's
independence:

&

-

Like many Chairs and Commissioners before me, I strongly believe
-that the agency's independence has been critical in allowing it to use
its expert judgment to do what is best for investors and the markets
a task that could otherwise be rendered impossible by the whims of
political pressure or the public mood. The Commission, in fact, was
created as an independent expert agency in 1934 precisely because
Congress identified a need for that strength in overseeing the American
capital markets.
Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chair, The SEC
after the Financial Crisis: Protecting Investors, Preserving Markets, Speech at
The Economic Club of New York (Jan. 17, 2017), (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/the-sec-after-the-financial-crisis.html).
112 The FTC's enabling statute is silent on independence. See Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. However, it has long been
considered independent. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 746 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]t is quite obvious that the Comptroller General, and
the General Accounting Office, have a fundamentally different relationship
with Congress than do independent agencies like the Federal Trade
Commission.").
113 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PRACTICE § 7:11 (3d ed.); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 27
("The term 'independent' agency or commission is often used to designate an
agency independent of the executive branch.").
L. Revesz, Deconstructing
114 See generally Kirti Datla & Richard
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769
(2013). The authors put forth seven features that provide an "indicia of
independence: removal protection, specified tenure, agency structure, partisan
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their criteria to better compare the CFPB against agencies defined
as independent by their enabling statute or that have long been
considered independent. 11 5
As shown in Figure 1 and as discussed in the following
sections, the Bureau is more independent and has more authority
than any other regulatory body.

balance requirements, litigation authority, budget and congressional
communication authority, and adjudication authority." Id. at 784. They analyze
an extensive array of agencies to argue that all agencies are in fact executive,
and that varying characteristics make them either more or less independent. Id.
at 825. According to them, "there is no single feature that every agency
commonly thought of as independent shares, not even a for-cause removal
provision. Id. at 842. Professor Romano refers to the same set of characteristics
in her comparison of the CFPB and three other agencies. Romano, supra note
10, at 273, 291.
11
Unlike Datla's and Revesv's scholarly contribution, this Article has a
far more modest undertaking and only compares agencies to show that the
CFPB's structure and scope of authority is entirely unique. This Article uses
only four characteristics from Datla and Revesz: agency structure (i.e., single
director), removal protection, litigation authority, and adjudicative authority.
Also, this Article modifies one of Datla's and Revesz's characteristics: rather
than evaluate the budget and congressional communication authority, this
Article considers only whether the agency's economically significant regulations
are subject to OIRA's review pursuant to Executive Order ("EO")12,866.
Finally, this Article includes two characteristics not identified by them: whether
the agency is subject to Congress' power of the purse and the scope of the
agency's jurisdiction.
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Figure 1. Comparison of the CFPB and Other Independent Agencies
CFPB SSA OSC FHFA OCC FDIC CFTC SEC FTC
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16 Under Section 6(a)(3) of EO 12,866, when agencies plan to undertake a
"significant regulatory action," they must submit certain materials for OIRA's
review and approval. Agencies listed under the PRA's definition of
"independent regulatory agency" are exempted from OIRA's review. 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502 (2019). These agencies include the CFPB, the FHFA, the OCC, the
FDIC, the CFTC, the SEC, and the FTC. See note 102 and accompanying text.
The SSA and the OSC are excluded from the list, and therefore, are subject to
OIRA's review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
"
The CFPB is led by a single director. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (2010). There
are other single director-led independent agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1) (1996)
(For the SSA, "There shall be in the Administration a Commissioner of Social
Security ... who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate."); 5 U.S.C. § 1211(a) (1994) (For the OSC, "There is
established the Office of Special Counsel, which shall be headed by the Special
Counsel."); 12 U.S.C. § 4512(a) (2008) (For the FHFA, "There is established the
position of the Director of the Agency, who shall be the head of the Agency.");
12 U.S.C. § 1(b)(1) (2011) (For the OCC, "The chief officer of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency shall be known as the Comptroller of the
Currency.').
"1 The CFPB director is removable only for cause. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3)
(2010). Generally, removal protection indicates an agency is independent. See 42
U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (1996) (For the SSA, "An individual serving in the office of
Commissioner may be removed from office only pursuant to a finding by the
President of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office."); 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (1994)
(For the OSC, "The Special Counsel may be removed by the President only for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."); 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2)
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(2008) (For the FHFA, "The Director shall be appointed for a term of 5 years,
unless removed before the end of such term for cause by the President."); 15
U.S.C. § 41 (2010) (For the FTC, "Any Commissioner may be removed by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."). The OCC
is an exception. 12 U.S.C. § 2 (1935) ("The Comptroller of the Currency.. .shall
hold his office for a term of five years unless sooner removed by the President,
upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate."). Nevertheless, the
OCC is considered an independent agency. See HOGUE, ET AL., supra note 108,
at 8 ("It is said that the OCC is part of the Treasury, but that is a real estate
statement since the OCC in policy-making is, by statute, independent of the
Treasury."). The enabling statutes of the SEC, the FDIC, and the CFTC are
silent on removal. However, it has long been considered that SEC
commissioners can be removed only for cause. See, e.g., SEC v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988) (accepting that "it is
commonly understood that the President may remove a commissioner only for
'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office"). Though never litigated,
there is a general expectation that the President can remove the heads of the
FDIC or the CFTC only for cause. See generallyHOGUE,ETAL., supranotel08,
at 7-8.
11' The CFPB's funding is from the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 5497
(2010). Other independent regulators also receive funding outside of the annual
appropriations process. 12 U.S.C. § 4516 (2008) (FHFA); 12 U.S.C. § 16 (2010)
(OCC); 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2018) (FDIC). It is just as common for Congress to
exert its "power of the purse." 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 57c (FTC);
42 U.S.C. §§ 903(j) (SSA's Social Security Advisory Board), 904(b) (SSA's main
budgetary appropriation requests), and 907a(h) (SSA's National Commission on
Social Security). OSC receives funding through the Financial Services-General
Government Appropriations Bill. JUSTIN MURRAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40858, LOCATE AN AGENCY OR PROGRAM WITHIN APPROPRIATIONS BILLS
11 (2019). For an understanding of the CFTC's reauthorization process, see
RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44733, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION: PROPOSED REAUTHORIZATION IN THE 115TH
CONGRESS 2-5 (2017).
120 The CFPB has independent litigation authority, and thus, does not have
to rely on the Department of Justice for bringing enforcement actions. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5564(a)-(e) (2010). Other independent agencies are similarly situated. 12 U.S.C.
§ 4513(c) (2008) (FHFA); 2 Op. O.L.C. 129 (1978) (concluding that OCC has
independent litigation authority); 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1994) (FDIC); 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2(a)(4), 9(4), 13a-1 (2010) (CFTC); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa, 78u, 78u-1, 78u-3, 78y
(2010) (SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)-(c) (2006) (FTC).
121 The CFPB has adjudicative authority. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5492(a)(10), 5563.
Other independent agencies also have adjudicative authority. 42 U.S.C. 405
(2019) (SSA); 12 U.S.C. § 4581 (2008) (FHFA); 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2008) (CFTC); 15
U.S.C. § 78w (2011) (SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006) (FTC).
122 The CFPB has broad jurisdiction. Romano, supranote 10, at 298 ("The
CFPB's expansive grant of authority to 'ensur[e] that all consumers have access
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B. Less Executive andLess CongressionalOversight
Independent agencies are never completely free from
executive influence, but they are subject to far less presidential
oversight than any executive branch agency. As a general matter,
presidents cannot remove the heads of independent agencies for
political reasons and can terminate them only for cause. Heads of
executive branch agencies, however, are, often removed when
administrations change.123 Also, presidents cannot easily impact
how an independent agency implements a statutory program. In
contrast, presidents can issue executive orders that executive
branch agencies must follow. Independent agencies are merely
"requested," "asked," "encouraged," or told they "should" comply
with them.' 24 Further, the president can control the regulatory
agenda of executive branch agencies through the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") in the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"). 215
to markets for consumer financial products and services' that are 'fair,
transparent, and competitive,' is the antithesis of a narrow, technical mission.").
In comparison, other agencies have a far narrower scope of authority: private
claims for social security benefits (SSA); conduct of federal employees (OSC);
oversight of housing government-sponsored enterprises (FHFA); regulation of
certain banks (OCC and FDIC); oversight of derivatives markets (CFTC); and
oversight of securities markets (SEC). While the FTC arguably has broad
jurisdiction as a consumer protection agency, its lack of jurisdiction over banks
means its authority is substantially limited in comparison to the CFPB.
123 See generallyAnne Joseph O'Connell, AgencyRulemaking andPolitical
Transitions, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 471, 479-84 (2011).
124 Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A
Debate over Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 639 (2010).
125 For a discussion of OIRA's role in rulemaking, see Curtis W. Copeland,
The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal

Rulemaking, 33 FoRDHAM URBAN L.J. 1257 (2006). In 1993, then President

William Clinton issued EO 12,866, "Regulatory Planning and Review," which
sets forth a process for presidential review of rulemaking (and is still in effect).
For proposed and final economically significant rules, executive branch agencies
(but not independent agencies) must prepare a substantial amount of
information for OIRA review and approval. Under section 6(a)(3)(B), each
agency must provide OIRA:
(i) The text of the draft regulatory action, together with a reasonably
detailed description of the need for the regulatory action and an
explanation of how the regulatory action will meet that need; and (ii)
An assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the regulatory
action, including an explanation of the manner in which the regulatory
action is consistent with a statutory mandate and, to the extent
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The CFPB's leadership structure, therefore, tests the
bounds of independence from the executive branch. Independent
agencies are typically led by multi-member commissions, not single
directors. Moreover, single director-led agencies generally fall
under the executive branch. For CFPB critics, this raises two
concerns. First, the president cannot fire the Bureau's director at
will, and can only remove for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office."1 2 6 Thus, the agency's leadership is subject
to far less presidential control than any other existing single
director-head. Second, though the CFPB is led by a single
individual, its regulatory agenda is not subject to a president's
policies because OIRA does not review the Bureau's proposed or
final regulations.1 2 7 Thus, a president has less influence over the
Bureau than any other single director-led agency.
CFPB detractors also call into question the agency's source
of funding. Congress cannot use its "power of the purse" to control
the Bureau's priorities.12 8 As Figure 1 shows, a number of
independent agencies are similarly funded outside of the regular
appropriations process,12 9 but those agencies are nowhere near as
powerful as the CFPB.

permitted by law, promotes the President's priorities and avoids
undue interference with State, local, and tribal governments in the
exercise of their governmental functions.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). It is no surprise that independent
agencies would prefer to bypass an OIRA review because it has long been
considered "the place where regulations go to die." KENNETH GODWIN ETAL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING 65 (2013).
126
12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2010).
127 Under Title X section 1 100D, which amends the Paperwork Reduction
Act, the Director of Office of Management and Budget must "treat or review a
rule or order prescribed or proposed by the Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection on the same terms and conditions as apply to any rule or
order prescribed or proposed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System." 44 U.S.C. § 3513 (2012). Because EO 12,866, by its own terms, does
not apply to independent agencies and has never been applied to the Federal
Reserve Board, the CFPB does not submit its rules to OIRA. See supra note 125
and accompanying text.
128 See Kate Stith, Congress'Powerof the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1353
(1988) ("All appropriations thus may be conceived of as lump-sum grants with
'strings' attached. These strings, or conditions of expenditure, constitute
legislative prescriptions that bind the operating arm of government.").
129 For an overview of the appropriations process, see JAMES V. SATURNO,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION (2016).
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C More CongressionalDelegation ofAuthority
Congress made the Bureau primary responsible for
"Federal consumer financial law." Specifically, it instructed the
agency to:
*

Issue "rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal
consumer financial law;"1 30

*

"[E]nforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to
markets for consumer financial products and services" and
that
such
markets
are "fair,
transparent,
and
competitive;" and

*

Conduct hearings and adjudicate proceedings to "ensure or
enforce compliance" with Federal consumer law.13 2

From these directives alone, it is not apparent that Congress
entrusted the CFPB with thoroughly changing the regulatory
landscape. Even those who had been adamantly opposed to just
the agency's creation did not fully appreciate the scope of its
authority. Only with a careful parsing of Title X provisions does
it become evident that Congress designed a remarkably ambitious
statutory program.
1. Transfer of Powers Once under Several Regulators
"Federal consumer financial law" is defined broadly, 13 4 and
130

12 U.S.C.

§ 551 1(c)(5) (2010).

131 Id. § 5511(a).
132 12 U.S.C. § 5563
(2010).
13 During his first press conference as Acting Director,
Mulvaney declared,
"I'm just learning about the powers that I have as acting director." See Bre
Payton, Mick MulvaneyJust Savaged the CFPBIn HisFirstsPress Conference

as

Director,

FEDERALIST

(Nov.

27,

2017),

https://thefederalist.com/2017/11/2 7/mick-mulvaney-just-savaged-the-cfpb-inhis-first-press-conference-as-director/.
134 The term "Federal consumer financial law" means "provisions of
[Title X], the enumerated consumer laws, the laws for which authorities are
transferred under subtitles F and H, and any rule or order prescribed by the
Bureau under this title, an enumerated consumer law, or pursuant to the
authorities transferred under subtitles F and H. The term does not include the
Federal Trade Commission Act." 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) (2010).
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includes the term "enumerated consumer laws," which is in turn
defined as the eighteen federal consumer protection statutes that
previously had been under the purview of seven federal
regulators.1 35 In addition to transferring authority over these
statutes, Congress used the opportunity to increase consumer
protections under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
3
("FDCPA")1 3 6 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA").

1

2. Increased Authority
Title X granted the agency supervision, enforcement, and
rulemaking powers over "covered persons" and "service
providers." An analysis of the terms' definitions suggests that
Congress understood that given limited resources, the CFPB
would be unable to police the entire consumer financial services
industry. Through strategic definitions, Congress incentivized
each regulated entity to monitor its own compliance management
systems as well as those of their business partners':
*

A "covered person" means "any person that engages in
offering or providing a consumer financial product or

13
See supranote 45 and accompanying text. The definition of "enumerated
consumer laws" lists the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982;
the Consumer Leasing Act of 1976; the Electronic Fund Transfer Act; the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act; the Fair Credit Billing Act; the Fair Credit Reporting
Act; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; subsections (b) through (f) of section
43 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; sections 502 through 509 of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975; the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act; the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974; the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008; the Truth
in Lending Act; the Truth in Savings Act; section 626 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act; and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5481(12) (2010).
136 When Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977, it withheld rulemaking
authority (except in limited circumstances) from the FTC, the agency then
responsible for its enforcement. At the time, Congress believed that the statute
represented "comprehensive legislation which [would] fully address[] the
problem of collection abuses." S. REP. No. 95-382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6
(1977). Because the problems continued, Congress amended the FDCPA,
granting the Bureau authority to "prescribe rules with respect to the collection
of debts by debt collectors." 15 U.S.C. § 1692Ad) (2010).
137 Congress amended ECOA to allow the Bureau to collect data "to
facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws," among other things. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691c-2 (2010).
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""13

A "service provider" is a person who provides a "material
service to a covered person in connection with the offering
or provision by such covered person of a consumer financial
product or service." It also includes a person who
"participates in designing, operating, or maintaining the
consumer financial product or service" or "processes
transactions relating to the consumer financial product or
service."1

In business-to-business relationships, it is not always clear who is
the service provider and who is the covered person. Also, a
"financial product or service" is defined to include business
activities traditionally offered by nonbanks.'4 0 For the first time, a
federal agency would have broad authority over these entities.
There is an added layer of complexity to Congress' grant of
Title X authorities. The Bureau's supervisory, enforcement, and
rulemaking powers vary in scope. 41 The Bureau's rulemaking
authority extends over "covered persons" and "service providers."
In contrast, the agency's enforcement authority is much broader.
For instance, its investigatory powers are expansive because the
CFPB may issue a civil investigative demand to any "person" 4 2
when the agency "has reason to believe that [such] person" has
"relevant" information regarding a violation of Federal consumer
financial law. 1 43 The Bureau's supervisory authority is more
restricted, extending only to certain covered persons defined by
statute or rule.1 44
12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A) (2010). The term "covered person" also means
"any affiliate of a person [that engages in offering or providing a consumer
financial product or service] if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such
person. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(B).
139 Id. § 5481(26)(A).
140 See id. § 5481(15).
For example, the CFPB has "exclusive" supervisory authority and
"primary" enforcement authority over banks as long as their assets are over $10
billion. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(b) (2010).
142 The
term "person" means "an individual, partnership, company,
corporation, association (incorporated or unincorporated), trust, estate,
cooperative, or other entity." Id. § 5481(19).
" Pursuant to a CID, the CFPB can require a person to produce
documents as well provide oral testimony, among other things. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5562(c)(1)(A)-(E) (2010).
144 See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514, 5515.
138

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

460

Vol. 31:3

The Bureau's powers as well as the interplay among the
definitions of "covered person," "service provider," and "financial
product or service" may impact entities unexpectedly. For
example, in May 2015, the CFPB found that two
telecommunications firms violated Title X.1 45
3.

Directive to Enforce New Consumer Protections

For over a century, statutory law has protected consumers
from business conduct that is unfair or deceptive. Section 5 of the
FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce." 14 6 With Title X, Congress expanded the FTC
Act's unfair and deceptive language. 147 Specifically, Title X makes
145 On
May 12, 2015, CFPB announced a settlement with two
telecommunications companies for unfair billing practices in violation of section
1036(a)(1)(B) of Title X, 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (2010). See Press Release,
CFPB, Statement on Sprint and Verizon Settlement (May 12, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-toobtain-1 20-million-in-redress-from-sprint-and-verizon-for-illegal-mobilecramming/. According to the CFPB, each telecommunications company
"provid[es] a consumer financial product or service," and therefore, each is a
"covered person." Specifically, the companies "extend[] credit to, and processes
payments for, consumers in connection with goods and services that [they] do[]
not directly sell or that consumers do not directly purchase from [Sprint or
Verizon]." It is not clear that these firms anticipated that their operations could
be characterized as:
"extending credit and servicing loans, including acquiring,
purchasing, selling, brokering, or other extensions of credit," 12 U.S.C.
§ 5481(15)(A)(i); and
"providing payments or other financial data processing products or
services to a consumer by any technological means, including
processing or storing financial or banking data for any payment
instrument, or through any payments systems or network used for
processing payments data, including payments made through an
online banking system or mobile telecommunications network," 12
U.S.C. § 5581(15)(A)(vii).
See Complaint, CFPB v. Sprint Corp., No. 14 CV 9931 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014);
see also Complaint, CFPB v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, No. 15
CV 3268 (D. N.J. May 12, 2015).
146 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(2012).
147 What constitutes "unfair" for purposes of Section 5 of the FTC
Act and
Title X are substantially the same. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (an unfair
act or practice is one that "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidably by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition") with 12
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it unlawful for entities "to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or
abusive act or practice" ("UDAAP")." By adding the term
"abusive," Congress essentially codified the common-law concept
of unconscionability. 1 49 Despite a statutory definition of the term
"abusive,"1 s0 CFPB detractors continue to raise concerns about its
vagueness and ambiguity."5 ' Notably, the agency has brought only
two enforcement cases (in over 200) solely on allegations of

U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (2010) (an unfair act or practice is one that "causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidably
consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition"). Neither statute defines "deceptive."
According to the CFPB, its interpretation of both terms generally comports with
FTC's. CFPB, CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS UDAAP EXAMINATION
MANUAL
(Oct.
2012),

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102012_cfpb-unfair-deceptiveabusive-acts-practices-udaaps-procedures.pdf ("The principles of 'unfair' and
'deceptive' practices in [Title X] are similar to those under [the FTC Act]" and
the FTC and federal banking regulators "have applied these standards through
case law, official policy statements, guidance, examination procedures, and
enforcement actions that may inform CFPB.").
148 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B).
149 See generallyCarey Alexander, Abusive: Dodd-FrankSection 1031
and
the Continuing Struggle to Protect Consumers, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1105
(2011) (detailing how the legislative history of Title X's definition of "abusive"
comports with the common-law doctrine of unconscionability).
1s0 Title X section 1031(d) defines an "abusive" act or practice to mean one
that:
1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
2) takes unreasonable advantage ofA) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a [entity] to act in
the interests of the consumer.
.12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2010).
`s Adam Levitin, Dodd-Frank's"Abusive"Standard:The Dog thatDidn't
Bark,

CREDIT

SLIPS

(June

20,

2017),

https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/06/abusive-the-dog-that-didntbark.html ("The CFPB's critics have been complaining about the vagueness of
the 'abusive' power ever since the Dodd-Frank Act was in the legislative
process.").
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"abusive acts or practices."1 5 2 In all other UDAAP enforcement
cases, allegations of "abusive" conduct accompanied purported
conduct that was either "unfair" or "deceptive."s1 3
4. Authority to Expand its Regulatory Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most impressive authority is the Bureau's
ability to broaden its regulatory jurisdiction-on its own accordover the consumer financial services industry through rulemaking.
*

The CFPB may augment its Title X authorities over
covered persons and service providers by issuing
regulations defining a "financial product or service."
Congress defined the term to include certain activities,
but it recognized that the agency is in the better position to
develop a complete list. Therefore, Congress granted the
CFPB discretionary rulemaking authority to define "other
financial product[s] or service[s]" when certain conditions
are met.' In June 2015, the CFPB issued its first final rule
defining certain automobile leases as a financial product or
service.1 5 6 The agency has not exercised this authority since.

Complaint, Consumer Prot. Fin. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 17-1278 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017); Consent Order, Consumer Prot. Fin.
Bureau v. Zero Parallel, LLC, No. 17-0017 (Sept. 6, 2017).
151 See Joshua
L. Roquemore, The CFPB's Ambiguous 'Abusive"
Standard, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 191, 192 (2018) ("CFPB v. Aequitas Capital
Management, Inc., and the Zero Parallel proceeding.. .represent the only two
occasions the CFPB has brought a stand-alone abuse claim.").
154 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i)-(x) (2010).
155 Id. § 5481(15)(A)(xi) (emphasis added).
156 12 C.F.R. § 1001.2 (2015).
152
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*

The CFPB may extend its supervisory authority over
nonbank entities beyond those explicitly listed.'" Congress
granted the CFPB authority to supervise nonbank "larger
participant[s]" of markets for other consumer financial
products or services as it defines by rule.'5 Since 2012, the
agency has exercised this rulemaking authority five times,
and it now has the authority to supervise larger participants
of markets for Consumer Reporting, 5 9 Consumer Debt
Collection,"o Student Loan Servicing,'6 1 International
Money Transfers,1 6 2 and Automobile Financing.1 63

*

The CFPB may identify new consumer protections beyond
those explicitly provided under "Federal consumer law."
Specifically, the CFPB can issue rules that would identify
certain conduct as unfair, deceptive, or abusive.'6 4 More
importantly, the Bureau has the authority to issue rules that
would require companies to prevent UDAAPs.16' The
agency's first UDAAP rulemaking is the Payday Rule, 166

1s7 Congress tasked the agency to supervise nonbanks of all sizes in the
residential mortgage, private education lending, and payday lending markets
for compliance with federal consumer financial law. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)
(2014). Congress also granted CFPB authority to supervise any nonbank
(regardless of size) if the Bureau has "reasonable cause to determine. . .that such
[nonbank] is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers
with regard to the offering or provision of consumer financial products or
services." 12 U.S.C. § 55 14(a)(1)(C). On July 3, 2013, the Bureau finalized a rule
that sets forth the procedures by which a nonbank may become subject to the
agency's supervision. 12 C.F.R. § 1091.
158 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B).
159 77 Fed. Reg. 42,874 (July 20, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1090.100
(2017)).
160 77 Fed. Reg. 65,775 (Oct. 31, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1090.105).
161 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383 (Dec. 6, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §
1090.106).
112 79 Fed. Reg. 56,631 (Sept. 23, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §
1090.107).
163 80 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 30, 2015) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §
1090.108).
164 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (2010).
165 Id. § 5531(b) ("Rules under this section may include requirements for
the
purpose of preventing such acts or practices.").
166 Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans,
81
Fed. Reg. 47,863 (July 22, 2016) (proposed rule July 22, 2016) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 1041). After reviewing over 1.4 million comments, the CFPB
finalized its rule. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment
Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,472 (final rule Nov. 17, 2017) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1041). Under the regulation, lenders cannot make a loan without first
determining if the customer has the ability to repay (ATR) it.
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which would have become effective in January 2018, but
was reopened for further consideration.16 1
Title X's complex statutory language suggests Congress'
intent for an overhaul in the regulation of the consumer financial
services industry.1 8 It is no surprise that those who support free
markets continue opposing what they view as unacceptable
government intrusion.

III. POLITICIZATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
Like many other federal agencies, Congress tasked the
CFPB with: (i) law-making power (promulgating regulations to
implement Title X); (ii) enforcement authority (conducting
investigations and bringing actions); and (iii) judicial oversight
(ruling on administrative proceedings). Yet, our Founding Fathers
were clear:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few,
or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of

tyranny.169
Nevertheless, the modern administrative state is replete with
agencies that have all three. 17 0 But the CFPB in particular is an
easy target for critics because its agency design is unlike any other.
See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
See generally Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial
Protection:Stronger Agency andStrongerLa ws, 13 Wyo. L. REv. 405 (2013).
169 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
170 The Supreme Court has long approved of them. See, e.g., Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (finding that FTC, with its quasilegislative and quasi-judicial functions and its commission members removable
for cause, does not violate separation of powers); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (noting that "existence" of
Board, which has all three powers, does not violate separation of powers). Some
legal scholars continue to argue that federal agencies are unconstitutional, but
even they concede that our government could not function without them. See
167
168

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION

OF THE LAW 158 (1990) ("Thus, it is too late to overrule not only the decision
legalizing paper money but also those decisions validating certain New Deal and
Great Society programs pursuant to the congressional powers over commerce,
taxation, and spending. To overturn those would be to overturn most of modern
government and plunge us into chaos.").
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It is exactly this unconventional structure along with its expansive
powers that makes partisan attacks against the Bureau inevitable.
The stakes over the agency's leadership and priorities are far
higher than for traditional independent regulatory commissions or
executive branch agencies. In that way, Congress' attempt to
shield the Bureau from politics had a perverse effect. This section
will discuss the political and legal objections against the CFPB,
and then evaluate the trade-off inherent in choosing between a
single-head agency and a multi-member commission.
A. Legislative Proposals& ConstitutionalAttacks
During Obama's first midterm elections, every Republican
"competing for national office, from Hawaii to New Hampshire,
ran against his agenda and made it the centerpiece of the
campaign."' He called the results of the November 2010 elections
a "shellacking,"1 7 2 recognizing that the outcome was a check to his
agenda."' The Democrats handed over control of the House, losing
sixty-three seats to Republicans.1 74 Though the Democrats
managed to retain control of the Senate, Republicans picked up six
seats. 7 s The upcoming Congress would be controlled by different
parties and conservatives were buoyed by the results. A top agenda
item was resolving some of the problems they saw in the DoddFrank Act.7

6

171 James Ceaser, The 2010 Verdic4 REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Nov. 10, 2010),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/11/10/the_2010_verdict_107908
.html.
172 After 'Shellacking,' Obama Laments Disconnect with Voters, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39987154/ns/politicsdecision_2010/tlafter-shellacking-obama-laments-disconnectvoters/#.XNCDAC-ZMWp.
"1 See Ceaser, supra note 171 ("The midterm election is one of the
distinctive features of America's constitutional system. By allowing for an
expression of voter sentiment separate from the selection of the president,
midterms help supply the concrete political support in Congress for checking
presidential programmatic power."). The November 2010 elections was the
greatest defeat for a newly elected president in a midterm since 1922 with the
Republican party under Warren Harding. Id.
" David C. Beckwith, US 2010 Midterm Elections, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.britannica.com/topic/U-S-2010Midterm-Elections-1740742.

176 See Dave Clarke & Rachelle Younglai, Republicans ability to reshape
3,
2010),
REUTERS
(Nov.
Dodd-Frank
limited,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-elections-financial-

466

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 31:3

With Republicans firmly in control of the House, the
legislative attacks on financial regulatory reform started on the
first day of the first session of the 112th Congress. On January 5,
2011, Representative Michele Bachman (R-MN) introduced a bill
to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act in its entirety.' She was not alone
in her efforts. Fourteen Republican congressmembers cosponsored her bill."" Less than three months later, on March 31,
Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) introduced an identical bill, entitled
"Financial Takeover Repeal Act of 2011.""' His bill had twentyeight co-sponsors. 8 0 On April 6, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL)
proposed similar legislation.'"' Even though all three bills died in
regulation/republicans-ability-to-reshape-dodd-frank-limitedidUSTRE6A282N20101103 ("With Democrats still controlling the Senate ...
any major legislative changes would likely fall flat, even before facing a veto
threat from the White House."). Though Senate Republicans were in the
minority, they used parliamentary procedures to stall Obama's nomination of
Richard Cordray to head the CFPB. Cordray was not confirmed until thenSenate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-NV) threatened to change filibuster
rules to allow for confirmation of agency nominees by a simple majority and
Reid and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) reached a compromise. Paul Kane & Ed
O'Keefe, Senate reaches tentative deal on filibusterrules, WASH. POST (July 16,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-take-up-keyrule-changes/2013/07/16/167045da-eeld-11e2-90086le94a7ea2Od story.html?utmterm=.055cOf42f7e6.
" To repeal the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, H.R. 87, 112th Cong. (2011).
178 Representatives Tom McClintock (R-CA), Bill Pdsey (R-FL), W. Todd
Akin (R-MO), Darrell E. Issa (R-CA), John J. Duncan, Jr. (R-TN), Steve King
(R-IA), Dennis A. Ross (R-FL), Paul C. Broun (R-GA), Joe Walsh (R-IL), Rob
Bishop (R-UT), Trent Franks (R-AZ), Sam Johnson (R-TX), David Schweikert
(R-AZ), and Benjamin Quayle (R-AZ) supported Bachman's bill. See H.R. 87.
179 Financial Takeover Repeal Act of 2011, S. 712, 112th Cong. (2011).
180 Senators Lamar Alexander, (R-TN), Tom Coburn (R-OK), John Cornyn
(R-TX), Mike Crapo (R-ID), John Ensign (R-NV), Kay Bailey Hutchison, (RTX), James M. Inhofe (R-OK), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Mike Johanns (R-NE),
Ron Johnson (R-WI), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Mike Lee (R-UT), Mitch McConnell (RKY), Rand Paul (R-KY), James E. Risch, (R-ID), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), John
Thune (R-SD), David Vitter, (R-LA), Richard C. Shelby (R-AL), Pat Toomey
(R-PA), Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Bob Corker (R-TN),
Roger F. Wicker (R-MS), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Roy Blunt, (R-MO), John
Boozman, (R-AR),.and Dean Heller (R-NV) supported DeMint's bill. See S. 712.
18 Dodd-Frank Repeal Act of 2011, S. 746, 112th Cong. (2011). The only
difference from DeMint's bill was that Shelby's proposed legislation would have
kept Title XVI of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amounted to less than one page
about derivates. It is unlikely that Shelby felt strongly about Title XVI because
he had also co-sponsored DeMint's bill which had called for a wholesale repeal.
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committee, Republicans were relentless in their attempts to repeal
the entirety of the Dodd-Frank Act. They continued to introduce
such legislation during the 113th and 114th Congress.
Republicans' attacks were not limited to a wholesale repeal
of the statute. They mounted an aggressive campaign directed at
just the CFPB. On February 8, 2011, well before the agency was
scheduled to open its doors on July 21,182 Representative Randy
Neugebauer (R-TX) put forth the "Consumer Financial Protection
Oversight Act of 2011.113 He sought to strip the CFPB of its
independence, making it an executive branch agency under the
Department of Treasury. This bill also died in committee, 18 4 but
that did not discourage Republicans from introducing half a dozen
more bills that targeted the Bureau before it could even begin its
operations.' Republicans also tried curbing the agency's powers.
In addition to introducing three more bills that would make CFPB
subject to more congressional oversight, Republicans proposed
legislation that either repealed a statutorily-granted power or
created additional hurdles before it could exercise its authority. 186
182 Then-Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, selected July 21, 2011 as
the designated transfer date. 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,253 (Sept. 20, 2010).
18
Consumer Financial Protection Oversight Act of 2011, H.R. 557, 112th
Cong. (2011).
184 H.R. 557 (2011).
15 Four bills sought to put a commission in place, instead
of a single
director. See Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness
Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2081, 112th
Cong. (2011); Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of
2011, S. 737, 112th Cong. (2011); Responsible Consumer Financial Protection
Regulations Act of 2011, H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (related to S. 737). One
bill would have the agency subject to the regular appropriations process. Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection Accountability Act, H.R. 1640, 112th Cong.
(2011). Another bill sought to limit its authority until a director was confirmed
by the Senate. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Transfer Clarification
Act, H.R. 1667, 112th Cong. (2011).
186 Three bills would subject the CFPB to congressional appropriations.
Sequester Replacement Reconciliation Act of 2011, H.R 5652, 112th Cong. (as
passed by House, May 10, 2012); Averting the Fiscal Cliff, H.R. 6688, 112th
Cong. (as reported to Subcommittee on Health, Dec. 20, 2012); Spending
Reduction Act, H.R. 6684, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 20, 2012). One
bill sought to repeal the Bureau's UDAAP authority. H.R. 2612, 112th Cong. (as
referred to Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Aug.
22, 2011). Three other bills would subject the CFPB to additional requirements.
S. 3571, 112th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Sept. 19, 2012); Independent
Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong. (as introduced in
Senate, Aug. 1, 2012); Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615,
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Since 2011, Republicans have taken a "throw everything at
the wall and see what sticks" approach, introducing well over 165
bills-nearly two dozen bills during the 112th Congress,
approximately fifty bills during both the 113th and 114th, and
roughly forty-five bills during the 115th-to eliminate the agency,
amend its leadership structure, subject it to congressional
appropriations, restrict its powers, or some combination of the
above.'"' With a divided government from 2011 through 2016, and
even with a Republican president and a Republican-controlled
Congress in 2017 and 2018, the GOP has been unsuccessful."'
Nevertheless, Republicans remain undeterred, despite Democrats
regaining control of the House after the November 2018 midterm
elections. In May 2019, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) proposed
eliminating the CFPB and repealing Title X entirely. The bill has
no chance of passing, but still garnered seven Republican cosponsors.1 8 9 It is evident that legislation aimed at reforming the
Bureau must have strong bipartisan support. Thus, the CFPB
remains a single director-led independent agency that does not rely
on congressional appropriations.
Its structure is far from secure, however. Even before the
Bureau had been operating for a year, its detractors have sought
judicial relief. In June 2012, the State National Bank of Big Spring
("State National Bank") brought suit in D.C. federal district
court,'10 claiming that the CFPB's formation violates separation of
powers because the agency is not subject to Congress' "power of
the purse," its director can be removed only for cause, and its
interpretation of "Federal consumer financial law" is entitled to
112th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Sept. 22, 2011).
187 Document: Analysis of CFPB-Related Bills Proposed
from January 5,
2011 to June 15, 2019 (on file with author).
188 To be sure, legislation amending certain sections of the Dodd-Frank Act
was eventually enacted. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
189 Senators Mike Lee (R-UT), James M. Inhofe (R-OK), Ben Sasse (R-NE),
Mike Rounds (R-SD), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Rand Paul (R-KY), and John
Cornyn (R-TX) supported Cruz's bill. Repeal CFPB Act, S. 1335, 116th Cong.
(as introduced in Senate, May 6, 2019).
10 State National Bank of Big Spring, along with two free market advocacy
groups, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, and Cordray's appointment. Complaint, State
Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 12 CV 1032 (D.D.C. June 21, 2012).
In August 2013, the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdictional
standing. Memorandum Opinion, State NatI Bank of Big Spring, No. 12 CV
1032. That case was later overturned on appeal and remanded to the district
court.
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judicial deference.1 9 1 State National Bank also seemed to argue
that the Bureau's UDAAP power is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority because of Congress' failure to define
"unfair" and "deceptive."1 9 2 The case was put on hold until a
decision could be made in another constitutional challenge, PHH
19 3
Corp. v. CFPB.
In October 2016, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
agreed with PHH, finding that the CFPB's structure was
unconstitutional. 194 The majority opinion, written by then-Judge
Kavanaugh, seemingly rebuked Congress for responding to the
worst financial disaster since the Great Depression with an
unconventional solution, focusing on the novelty of the agency's
structure. 195 In January 2018, the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc
reversed. 196 The majority opinion took aim at Kavanaugh's
apparent disdain, "Novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first
time for everything," making explicit that "novelty alone [is]
insufficient to establish a constitutional defect."19 7
In February 2018, the State National Bank and the CFPB
filed a joint motion, agreeing that the PHHCorp. en banc decision
controls. 9 8 After the appellate court summarily affirmed, State
191

Complaint, State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring, No. 12 CV 1032 at

¶¶ 73-

75.

Complaint, State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring, No. 12 CV 1032 at It 3443. Specifically, State National Bank argues that the statute "provides no
definition for 'unfair' or 'deceptive' acts or practices, leaving those terms to the
CFPB to interpret and enforce, either through ad hoc litigation or through
regulation." No. 12 CV 1032 at 1 36. This is inaccurate. Congress did not define
the term "deceptive" in Title X (consistent with the FTC Act), but it did define
the term "unfair." 12 U.S.C. § 553 1(c)(1) (2010) (an "act or practice is unfair" if it
"causes or is likely to cause substantial injusry to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers; and such substantial injury is not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.").
19 PHH Corp v. CFPB, Docket No. 15-01177 (D.C. Cir. Jun 19, 2015).
194 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir.
2016), reh'gen banc granted, order vacated(Feb. 16, 2017).
195 Judge Kavanaugh's majority opinion uses the word "novel" or "novelty"
nearly a dozen times to describe the agency's structure and other structures or
practices that were found unconstitutional. E.g., PHH Corp, 839 F.3d at 7
(CFPB's "novel, single-Director agency structure"); Id. at 8 ("the novelty of the
Board's structure"); Id. at 10 (CFPB's "novel agency structure"); Id. at 40 ("novel
practice").
"6 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(en banc decision).
192

197 Id. at 103.
'" Joint Motion

for Requesting Entry of Judgement Against the Plaintiffs,
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National Bank filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court in September 2018.199 With the change in the administration,
the Department of Justice sided with State National Bank, but still
urged the Court to deny the petition. It claimed that this case
"would be a poor vehicle for considering the constitutionality of the
Bureau's structure." 2 0 0 In January 2019, the Court agreed, denying
certiorari.2 0 1
Though it refrained from evaluating the agency's
constitutionality, it is likely only a matter of time before the Court
does, especially if a split emerges among the circuit courts. Only
one other circuit has addressed the issue. In May 2019, relying on
the D.C. Circuit's en banc decision in PHH Corp., a unanimous
Ninth Circuit panel agreed that the Bureau's structure was not
20 2
Two more
constitutionally defective in CFPB v. Seila Law.
coming
the
in
design
agency's
the
review
to
poised
are
circuits
on an
rule
must
court
the
months. In the Fifth Circuit,
the
that
interlocutory appeal from the district court's finding
203
structure is constitutional. In the Second Circuit, the CFPB and
the New York Attorney General 20 4 are appealing Judge Loretta
Preska's ruling that both the agency's structure and Title X in its
entirety are unconstitutional.2 0 5
After losing its constitutional challenge, Seila Law has
asked the Supreme Court to weigh in, giving the Court another
opportunity to rule on the matter.2 06 With Justice Kavanaugh now
State Nat'1 Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, No. 12 CV 1032 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
'99 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State Nat'1 Bank of Big Spring v.
Mnuchin, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019), 2018 WL 4331933.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 9-10, State Nat'l Bank of Big
20
Spring v. Mnuchin, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019), 2018 WL 6504249 (reasoning that
Justice Kavanaugh participated in matter as a judge on the D.C. Circuit such
that a full Court could not render a decision and that jurisdictional concerns
exist such that the Court may not even reach the constitutional issue).
201 State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019).
202 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680, 684 (9th
Cir. 2019).
203 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All American Cashing, Inc., No. 16-356
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2008).
204 See 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2010) (provides state attorneys general authority
to enforce Title X provisions).
205 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp.
3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
206 On June 28, 2019, Seila Law filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Seila Law LLC, 923
F.3d 680 (No. 17-5632 7).
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on the highest bench and the other sitting Justices' positions on
separation-of-powers,
nondelegation,
and
the
modern
administrative state, it would surprise no one if the Court struck
down the CFPB's constitutionality.2 0 7 Therefore, without
Congress' intervention, the Bureau could be eliminated or more
likely, be coopted by whichever party happens to hold the
executive branch.
B. The Inherent Trade-Offin LeadershipDesign
In 1788, Founding Father James Madison, wrote of
"political experiments" when discussing the document that would
become our U.S. Constitution.20 8 Over 200 years later, that
document with its three branches of government and its systems of
checks and balances continues to serve as a blueprint for our
political experiments. And make no mistake, the CFPB was a
political experiment in agency design.
During the CFPB's first six years, Congress' experiment
appeared successful. The Bureau operated as intended: "to serve

207 See Gundy v. United States, No. 17-6086 (U.S. June 20, 2019), available
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-6086_2b8e.pdf. In Gundy,
a plurality of the Court (Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor)
declined to revive the nondelegation doctrine (i.e., Congress cannot delegate its
legislative authority). Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but separately
opined that "If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach
we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort." Id. at *23.
Unsurprisingly, Justice Gorsuch disagreed. His dissenting opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, is a history lesson on his views of the
framers' vision of Congress' role and the nondelegation doctrine, and why the
doctrine must be revisited. Id. at *24. (Justice Kavanaugh did not participate
because he had not been confirmed when the case was argued. Thus, his view
on the doctrine is unclear. Nevertheless, his earlier opinions in PHHCorp. make
evident his thoughts on the CFPB's structure.) See also Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 161929
(U.S.
June
26,
2019),
available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-15_9p6b.pdf. In Kisor, a
plurality of the Court declined to overrule Auer v. Robbins, which provides that
as long as an agency has a reasonable interpretation of its own regulations, then
courts will defer to the agency. Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor
supported the Auerdeference on the merits while Chief Justice Roberts' decision
was grounded in stare decisis. Again, unsurprisingly, Justice Gorsuch strongly
disagreed with judicial deference to agencies, signaling future attacks on the role
of agencies. Id. at *28-29. He was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Kavanaugh who would have overturned Auer.
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as a cop on the beat." 2 0 9 When the November 2010 midterm
elections resulted in a "shellacking" for the Democrats, nothing
changed for the agency.21 0 It was business as usual after the
November 2012 elections 211 and even after the 2014 midterm
elections when Republicans gained control of both chambers of
Congress for the first time since the agency's inception.2 12 Even the
November 2016 elections-which brought the political branches
entirely under Republican control 21 3-failed to impact the CFPB's
operations (at least statutorily).2 1 4
See KAISER, supra note 46, at 72 (In his initial impressions on Congress'
response to the financial crisis, Dodd believed that [r]egulators would have to
become 'strong cops on the beat,' not enablers of risky behavior.").
210 See After 'Shellacking,'Obama Laments Disconnect with Voters, supra
note 172.
211 See Janna Harron, CFPB's existence at stake in election, BANKRATE
(Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/politics/cfpb-existence-atstake-election.aspx ("It's a no-brainer that the CFPB, which was created during
Obama's administration, would stay in business if the president wins reelection.").
212 See Stephen Collinson, Republicansseize Senate, gainingfull control of
20'

Congress,

CNN

POLITICS

(Nov.

5,

2013),

https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/04/politics/election-day-story/index.html. With a
Democratic president, a Republican-controlled Congress would need
Democrats' votes to override any veto. Domenico Montanaro et al., President
Obama dra ws a line in the sand with State of the Union, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan.
21, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/president-obama-draws-linesand-state-union ("[T]he speech contained veto threats on everything from a
rollback of his health care law, Dodd-Frank Wall Street regulations,
immigration and Iran sanctions."); Vetoes by PresidentBarack Obama, U.S.
2019),
16,
June
visited
(last
SENATE
https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/ObamaBH.htm
(Obama's 12 vetoes during his administration, ten of which occurred after the
November 2014 midterm elections, were unrelated to the CFPB.).
213 Sarah Frostenson, Republicans now control the presidency, the Senate,
and the House, Vox (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.vox.com/presidentialelection/2016/11/9/13572972/republicans-control-presidency-senate-house.
214 There had been grand plans to diminish the CFPB's authority..Marilyn
Geewax, Trump Team Promises To 'Dismantle' Dodd-Frank Bank
Regulations, NPR (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/11/10/501610842/trump-team-promises-to-dismantle-dodd-frankbank-regulations. What was enacted, however, had no impact on the CFPB.
Aaron Klien, No, Dodd-Frank was neither repealed nor gutted. Here's what
2018),
25,
(May
BROOKINGS
happened,
really
https://www.brookings.edu/research/no-dodd-frank-was-neither-repealed-norgutted-heres-what-really-happened/ ("The legislation itself does not touch the
CFPB."). A Republican-controlled Congress along with a Republican president

2019

Commissioningthe CFPB

473

Then, almost a year into Trump's presidency, it became
evident the agency's insulation from politics was in fact illusory.
Of course, those who helped design the Senate's version of the
Bureau's leadership and accountability structure had to have
recognized that someday there would be a Republican-controlled
Congress, a Republican-controlled White House, or both. It was
foreseeable, that individuals who believe in less government
oversight would someday select the agency's director.
And yet, CFPB supporters have been stunned by the
agency's new direction. Possibly, no one expected the directional
change to happen as early as it did.2 15 Maybe, no one expected
leaders such as Mulvaney, who openly disparaged the CFPB,2 16 or
Kraninger, who has no expertise in consumer finance.2 17 Perhaps,
managed to revise only certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. See generally
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
215 Conventional wisdom suggested that a Clinton administration would
take over on January 20, 2017. SeeDanielle Kurtzleben, 4 PossibleReasons The
Polls Got It So
Wrong This Year, NPR (Nov. 4,
2016),
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/14/502014643/4-possible-reasons-the-polls-got-itso-wrong-this-year ("[C]hances are that you expected Hillary Clinton to win last
week."). CFPB supporters likely did not expect a deregulatory environment
within a decade after the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
216 Mulvaney's appointment was in line with Trump's previous track
record of selecting individuals who are critical of the agencies they would lead.
See, e.g., Brad Plumer, Rick Perry once wanted to abolish the Energy
Department,Vox (Dec. 13, 2016, 12:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andsee
environment/2016/12/13/139362 10/rick-perry-energy-department-trump;
also, Dominique Mosbergen, Scott Pruitt Has Sued the Environmental
Protection Agency 13 Times, HUFFPOST (Jan. 17, 2017, 9:44 AM),
https://www.huffpost.comlentry/scott-pruitt-environmental-protectionagency-n_5878adl5e4b0b3ca7b0c29c.
217 Kraninger's appointment was consistent with Trump's preference for
selecting individuals to run agencies for which they have no expertise. See, e.g.,
Anya Kamenetz, How Betsy DeVos Became Trump's Least Popular Cabinet
3,
2017),
(Feb.
Pick,
NPR
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/02/03/513037533/how-betsy-devosbecame-trump-s-least-popular-cabinet-pick (detailing Betsy Devos' lack of
experience and limited understanding of major federal education law); Camila
Domonoske, Ben Carson Confirmed As Secretary Of Housing And Urban
Development, NPR (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/03/02/518160876/ben-carson-confirmed-as-secretary-of-housing-andurban-development ("Carson was a controversial nominee to lead HUD because
of his lack of experience in either housing or development - or government in
general.").

Vol. 3 1:3

Loyola ConsumerLaw Re view

474

no one could have predicted a White House that does not adhere
to presidential customs or traditions.2 18 More likely, the answer is
all of the above. Nevertheless, those that supported CFPB's
unconventional structure and continue to do so are likely operating
under misconceptions about institutional design.
An agency with a single director can move fast, but that
does not mean necessarily better. Even CFPB supporters must
concede that the Bureau's structure is not inherently preferable.
As discussed in this section, they had little recourse when
Mulvaney's leadership resulted in agency actions that were
entirely counter to those under his predecessor.
On November 24, 2017, Director Cordray resigned before
completing his five-year term.21 9 Just before stepping down, he
reassigned then Chief of Staff Leandra English to serve as deputy
director. 2 20 Relying on a provision in Title X, the move allowed her
to serve as CFPB's director in an acting capacity. 221 That same
218

E.g., Jonathan Lemire, How Trump has rewritten the rules of the

presidency,

PBS

NEWS

HOUR

(Dec.

27,

2018),

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-trump-has-rewritten-the-rules-ofthe-presidency.
219 Letter of Resignation from Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, to Donald J. Trump, President, U.S. (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.comlwpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/1 1/Resignation-letter.pdf.
220 Letter from Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to
2017),
24,
(Nov.
Bureau,
Fin.
Prot.
Staff,
Consumer
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015f-efff-d9Od-a37f-ffff72670000. On the
same day, the agency issued a press release, "announc[ing] that Leandra English
has been officially named deputy director of the agency." Press Release,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Leandra English Named Deputy Director of the
2017),
24,
(Nov.
Bureau
Prot.
Fin.
Consumer
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/leandra-englishnamed-deputy-director-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/. Prior to the
Cordray's announcement, David Silberman, Associate Director of Research,
Markets, and Regulations had served as the agency's Acting Deputy Director.
Without an official Deputy Director, it was unlikely that one acting in that
capacity could simultaneously serve as Acting Director. See Gillian B. White,
The Departing Consumer-Finance Director Moves to Thwart Trump,
ATLANTIC

(Nov.

24,

2017),

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/1 1/cfpb-cordraytrump/546734/ ("By installing an official deputy, Corday.. .is providing the
agency with its best defense against a Trump appointee taking over the
Bureau's leadership.").
221 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B) (2010) ("There is established the position of
Deputy Director who shall serve as the acting Director in the absence or
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day, Trump installed his own acting director under a federal
statute that allows a president to appoint an interim replacement
without Senate confirmation.2 2 2 He appointed his. OMB Director
Mick Mulvaney.22 3
The appointment caused an uproar. When Mulvaney was
a congressman he had said, "I don't like the fact that the CFPB
exists"2 24 and co-sponsored legislation to eliminate the agency.2 2 5
He had called the Bureau a "joke,"2 26 introducing bills that would
have made it more difficult for the CFPB to enforce its authority. 2 2 7
unavailability of the Director.").
222 The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3345-3349c
(2004). An individual may not serve for longer than "210 days beginning on the
date the vacancy occurs" or "once a first or second nomination for the office is
submitted to the Senate, from the date of such nomination for the period that
the nomination is pending in the Senate." Id. § 3346(a). If the first or second
nomination is "rejected, withdrawn, or returned," the 210-day clock may reset.
Id. § 3346(b). Accordingly, Trump's acting director could serve in this capacity
for years.
223 Press Release, White House, Statement on President Donald J. Trump's
Designation of OMB Director Mick Mulvaney as Acting Director of the
Consumer
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau
(Nov.
24,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donaldj-trumps-designation-omb-director-mick-mulvaney-acting-director-consumerfinancial-protection-bureaul.
224 Renae Merle, The CFPB now has two acting directors, WASH. POST
2017),
24,
(Nov.
https://www.washingtonpost.comnews/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-nowhas-two-acting-directors-and-nobody-knows-which-one-should-lead-thefederal-agency/?noredirect=on&utmterm=.b2531 f583980.
225 Then-Representative Mulvaney (R-SC) was an original cosponsor to
H.R. 3118, which sought to dismantle the Bureau. To eliminate the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection by repealing title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, commonly known as the
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 3118, 114th Cong. § 1 (2015).
226 Credit Union Times, Rep. Mick Mulvaney: "CFPB 'Sick, Sad Joke'
10,
2014),
(Sept.
YouTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaVeNafdyVA.
227 Then-Representative Mulvaney (R-SC) introduced three unsuccessful
bills:
(i) Legislation would have placed restrictions on how the agency conducts
its investigations. Bureau Examination Fairness Act, H.R. 4804, 113th Cong.
(as ordered to be reported by House, June 11, 2014);
(ii) Legislation would have placed conditions on the agency's rulemaking
authority over payday loans, vehicle title loans, and other similar loans. State
and Tribal Government Sovereignty Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 4737, 114th
Cong. (as introduced in House, Mar. 14, 2016); and
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After his appointment, Mulvaney did not alleviate concerns about
the agency's future, telling reporters that his opinion of the CFPB
remained unchanged.2 2 8
On Sunday, November 26, English sued, asking the court
to declare her the rightful acting director.2 2 9 She also filed a motion
for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent Mulvaney's
appointment. 23 0 It made for great political theatre. 23 1' And while
those close to the situation knew how it would eventually play
out,2 3 2 there was an upside. The news coverage ensured that many
more Americans learned about the CFPB and its purpose.2 3 3
On Monday morning, November 27, English and
Mulvaney both turned up at the Bureau, both sending staff emails
claiming to be the agency's acting director. 2 34 That afternoon,
(iii) Legislation would have required the CFPB Director to verify the
accuracy of consumer complaints before publishing them. H.R. 5491, 114th
Cong. (as referred to House Committee on Financial Services, June 15, 2016).
228 Payton, supra note 133. This was in marked contrast to how Energy
Secretary Rick Perry handled his nomination. Jay Brady, Rick Perry, Energy
Nominee, Says He No Longer Wants To Dissolve Agency, NPR (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/01/19/510585966/rick-perry-energy-nominee-sayshe-no-longer-wants-to-dissolve-agency.
229 Complaint at 8, English v. Trump et al., No. 1:17-cv-02534 (D.C. Cir.
2017).

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, English v. Trump et al., No.
1:17-cv-02534 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
231 Anthony Zurcher, CFPB in Chaos as Chief Refuses to Step Aside for
Trump's Man, BBC (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-42141367 ("'High drama' and 'bureaucratic power struggle' are words
that don't usually go together, but these are unusual times in Washington, DC.").
232 Doyle McManus, It's 'High Noon'at the CFPB, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29,
2017), https://www.latimes.comlopinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-cfpb-elizabethwarren-trump-20171129-story.html ("Eventually, President Trump will
nominate a new director who will obey his desire to be more accommodating to
banks and other lenders.").
233 See Fred 0. Williams, Poll: Few aware of embattled consumer
230

watchdog,

CREDITCARDS.COM

2017),

1,

(Mar.

https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/cfpb-consumer-watchdogpoll.php ("Despite $12 billion in refunds to 27 million consumers, CFPB is
largely unknown."); Maria LaMagna, Even before Cordray's exit, the CFPB
had an image problem as well as a political one, MARKET WATCH (Nov. 16,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/most-americans-say-they-dont2017),
have-a-clue-about-this-federal-agency-2017-03-02 ("[M]any Americans indicate
they would in theory support an agency like the CFPB, if they knew it existed.").
234 Renae Merle, Dueling officials spend chaotic day vying to lead federal
consumer

watchdog,

WASH.

PosT

(Nov.

27,

2017),
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twenty-five former and current members of Congress (all
Democrats) filed an amicus brief supporting English's motion.23 5
The next day, eight state attorneys general (all Republicans) moved
to file an amicus brief supporting Mulvaney's appointment. 23 6
That same day, the court denied English's TRO motion, finding
that there was not a substantial likelihood that the case would
succeed on its merits.23 7 While legal scholars disagreed, 236 English

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/two-dueling-officialsspend-chaotic-day-vying-to-lead-federal-consumerwatchdog/2017/11/27/38leada2-d39c-11e7-b62dd9345ced896dstory.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.74dl5d9f9f95;
Katie
Rogers, 2 Bosses Show Up to Lead the ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/2 7/us/politics/cfpb-leandra-englishmulvaney.html.
235 Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order, English v.
Trump et al., No. 1:17-cv-02534 (D.C. Cir. 2017). From the Senate, the
signatories were Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Catherine Cortez Masto (DNV), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Charles E. Schumer (D-NY),
Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). From the House, the
signatories were now Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Representatives Michael E.
Capuano (D-MA), Charlie Crist (D-FL), John Delaney (D-MD), Keith Ellison
(D-MN), Bill Foster (D-IL), Vicente Gonzalez (D-TX), Denny Heck (D-WA),
Jim Himes (D-CT), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Dan Kildee (D-MI), Carolyn B.
Maloney (D-NY), Gwen S. Moore (D-WI), Brad Sherman (D-CA), Juan Vargas
(D-CA), Nydia M. Velazquez (D-NY), and Maxine Waters (D-CA), former Rep.
Barney Frank (D-MA), and now former Rep. Ruben J. Kihuen (D-NV).
236 Motion of. the States of Texas, West Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina to File Brief as Amici
Curiae in Support of Defendants, English v. Trump et al., No. 1:17-cv-02534
(D.C. Cir. 2017). Because the court denied English's motion for a TRO, the
motion was denied as moot. Transcript of Motion Hearing, English v. Trump
et al., No. 1:17-cv-02534 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
237 Transcript of Motion Hearing, English v. Trump et al., No. 1:17-cv02534 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A week later, on December 6, English moved for
preliminary injunction. Later that month, the court again heard oral arguments
and on January 10, 2018, it denied her motion. Jim Puzzanghera, Federaljudges
indicate they could remove Mulvaney as acting CFPB chief L.A. TIMES (Apr.
12,
2018),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cfpb-mulvaney-englishhearing-20180412-story.html. Two days later, she appealed.
238 Adam Levitin, CFPB DirectorSuccession: What the Dodd-FrankAct's
Legislative History Tells
Us,
CREDITSLIPS
(Nov.
20,
2017),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/1 1/cfpb-directorship-successionwhat-legislative-history-tells-us.html.
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eventually dropped her suit23 9 after Trump nominated
Kraninger,2 40 then-OMB Deputy Director under Mulvaney.2 4 1
During the year before a new director could be confirmed
and sworn in,242 Mulvaney was true to his word: "Elections have
consequences at every agency, and that includes the CFPB."24 3 In
April 2017, under Cordray, the CFPB filed suit against four online
payday lenders, who charged annual interest rates ranging from
440 percent up to 950 percent, for deceiving consumers and
withdrawing funds from their bank account for debts not legally
owed.24 4 In January 2018, under Mulvaney, the CFPB withdrew
the suit without explanation.24 5 The number of enforcement
The appellate court held oral argument in April 2018, but English
dropped her suit before the court issued a ruling. Jim Puzzanghera, Leandra
EnglishResigns from CFPBandDropsherLegalFightto be its actingDirector,
L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-leandraenglish-cfpb-20180706-story.html.
240 Nominations & Appointments, White House, President Donald J.
Trump's Announces Intent to Nominate and Appoint Personnel to Key
Administration Posts (June 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intent-nominate-appointpersonnel-key-administration-posts-i1/. This was likely a strategic move.
Kraninger had barely any consumer finance experience, but CFPB supporters
were hesitant to restart the 210-day clock on Mulvaney's appointment. See
Doug Sword, Despite New CFPB Nominee, Mulvaney Could Be Around a
19,
2018),
(June
CALL
Time,
ROLL
Long
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/despite-new-cfpb-nominee-mulvaneyaround ("[If Kraninger is withdrawn or rejected by the Senate, that merely starts
another 210-day clock for Mulvaney to remain as acting director.").
241 Glenn Thrush, White House Confirms That Mulvaney Deputy is Pick
16,
2018),
(June
TIMES
Lead Consumer Bureau, N.Y.
to
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/kraninger-consumer-financialbureau.html.
242 Mulvaney served as acting director from November 25, 2017 (when
Trump appointed him) until Kraninger was sworn in on the evening of
December 10, 2018. Jim Puzzanghera, New CFPB DirectorKathy Kraninger
says she won't be a puppet of Mick Mulvaney, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-kathy-kraninger-cfpb-20181211story.html.
243 Allie Malloy, Showdown over top post at key watchdog agency, CNN
(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.cnn.coml2017/11/26/politics/leandra-english-cfpblawsuit-donald-trump/index.html.
244 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 7, Consumer
Prot. Fin. Bureau v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc. et al., No. 17 CV 3155 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 27, 2017).
245 CFPB signals shift by dropping payday lender lawsuit, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/cfpb-signals-shift-by239
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actions dropped dramatically: 48 were brought during Cordray's
last year while only 11 during Mulvaney's tenure.2 46 Cordray's last
quarterly budget request to the Federal Reserve was $217.1
million. For Mulvaney's first quarterly budget, he asked for zero
dollars.24 7 Mulvaney also reorganized the Bureau, effectively
diminishing the oversight of anti-discriminatory lending laws.24 8
He sought to rollback regulations, reopening the agency's final
Payday Rule on the day it was scheduled to go into effect.2 4 9 He
dropping-payday-lender-lawsuit ("This is signaling that the CFPB is going to
stand down on the online payday lenders, who refuse to comply with state
interest-rate caps.").
246 Document: Analysis of Enforcement Actions under Cordray and
Mulvaney (on file with author). On April 20, 2018, the Bureau reached a
settlement with Wells Fargo, fining the company $1 billion. Consent Order,
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 18-BCFP-0001 (Apr.
20, 2018). Though this was the first enforcement action under Mulvaney, the
matter was opened under Cordray, and according to former CFPB officials,
Mulvaney "had little to do with the case." Devin Leonard & Elizabeth
Dexheimer, Mick Mulvaneyls Having a Blast Running the Agency He Detests,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(May
25,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-25/mick-mulvaney-on-thecfpb-we-re-still-elizabeth-warren-s-child.
247 Michael Grunwald, Mulvaney requests no funding for Consumer
Financial Protection
Bureau,
POLITICO
(Jan.
18,
2013),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/18/mulvaney-funding-consumerbureau-cordray-345495.
248 Congress mandated the establishment of the Office of Fair Lending and
Equal Opportunity ("OFLEO"). 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c) (2015). During Cordray's
tenure, the Division of Supervision,- Enforcement, and Fair Lending was
comprised of OFLEO, Office of Supervision Policy, and Office of Enforcement.
This ensured that there would be an office entirely dedicated to the oversight
and enforcement of fair lending laws. During Mulvaney's tenure, he stripped
supervisory and enforcement powers from OFLEO, moving it to a division that
had been established to promote diversity within the agency. See O'Harrow Jr.
et al., supranote 5; Deborah Goldstein, Trump Appointee Move InvitesLending
Discrimination, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/medialtrump-appointee-move-inviteslending-discrimination.
249 On January 16, 2018, the effective date of the Payday Rule, the CFPB
issued a Statement announcing that it "intends to engage in a rulemaking
process so that the Bureau may reconsider" the rule. CFPB, CFPB Statement
on Payday Rule, (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/; see . also supra note 166 and
accompanying text. On February 14, 2019, in its new Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Bureau proposes delaying the compliance date to August 2019
and that lenders would no longer have to make ATR determinations before
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issued over a dozen Requests for Information ("RFI"),2 50 generally
the first step to amending rules or policies already in place.2 51
Mulvaney even sought to change the agency's name to the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection, which consumer groups saw as
a move away from being a consumer-focused agency.25 2 He likely
would have been successful, but for the $300 million price tag that
the industry would have had to incur.25 3
While Mulvaney is no longer leading the agency,

issuing the loan. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment
Loans; Delay of Compliance Date, 84 Fed. Reg. 4298 (proposed Feb. 14, 2019)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
15,
2019),
(June
CFPB
Closed Notices,
of
250 Archive
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/notice-opportunitiescomment/archive-closed/?categories=request-commentinfo&fromdate=12%2F1%2F2017&todate=12%2F11%2F2018. Mulvaney's
RFIs included calls for public opinion on how the Bureau writes regulations, 83
Fed. Reg. 10,437 (2018), enforces consumer laws, 83 Fed. Reg. 5999 (2018), and
supervises companies, 83 Fed. Reg. 7166 (2018).
251 Mick Mulvaney Puts All CFPB Operations Under Review, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 17, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mick-mulvaney-allcfpb-operations-under-review/. Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) issued a report
criticizing Mulvaney, claiming that the RFIs "reflect a strong bias toward
industry." MINORITY STAFF REPORT OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING,
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 116TH CONG. REP. ON PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: THE
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU UNDER THE TRUMP
CONSUMER
2018),
Nov.
Brown,
(Sherrod
21
ADMINISTRATION

https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/Pushing%20the%2OEnvelope
%20-%2oMick%2OMulvaney%20at%20CFPB%20FINAL.pdf.
25. Victoria Finkle, What's in a Name?ForMulvaney'sCFPB, Quite a Lot,
AM.

BANKER

(Apr.

25,

2018,

9:00

AM),

https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/whats-in-a-name-for-mulvaneyscfpb-quite-a-lot ("Mulvaney's efforts to downgrade 'Consumer' in favor of
'Bureau' reflect his attempt to not only weaken but also depersonalize the only
federal agency with only one job, protecting consumers.").
253 Sylvan Lane, Exclusive: ConsumerBureau Name Change Could Cost
2018),
3,
(Dec.
HILL
THE
Million,
$300
Firms
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/419527-exclusive-consumer-bureau-analysissays-name-change-could-cost-firms-300. It also would have cost the agency
anywhere from $9 million to $19 million to update materials and its website. Id.
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Kraninger
appears to be following her former boss' footsteps.25 5
The events following Cordray's departure plainly demonstrate
how Congress' design experiment does nothing to stop an
independent regulator from acting as an executive branch agency.
Even after the wild fluctuation in regulatory oversight
under Cordray's tenure to Mulvaney's, many CFPB supporters
continue to believe that a single director is far better than a
commission. They argue that a commission-led agency inevitably
leads to delays, and that such agencies are inherently slow and
unresponsive. Most often, the SEC is cited as an example of why
multi-member, bipartisan commissions fail.256
The SEC's criticisms may very well be deserved. Before the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, many had doubts about the
agency's effectiveness. In fact, there were discussions about
combining the SEC with the CFTC, placing the SEC under the
monitoring of a more robust agency, and even eliminating the
agency altogether.2 " Nearly nine years after the passage of the
254 On December 11, 2018, Kraninger was sworn in as the second director
of the CFPB. Vote Summary on Roll Call Vote 11 Congress- 2 d Session, U.S.

SENATE,

https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-calllists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?c
ongress=115&session=2&vote=00255. She was confirmed by a Republicancontrolled Senate to a five-year term. Id. Her confirmation was along party lines,
50-49. Id. Senator Tom Tillis (R-NC) did not vote. Id.
255 For example, like Mulvaney, Kraninger believes that Congress must
give the Bureau explicit authority before it can examine regulated entities for
compliance with the Military Lending Act, which provides servicemembers
consumer protections (e.g., caps interest rates to 36 percent). Katie O'Donnell,
Militarypersonnelcaughtin crossfireoverlendinglaw, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/09/military-personnel-caught-incrossfire-over-lending-law-1290791. According to news reports, in August 2018,
Mulvaney intended to cease monitoring for the law's compliance because he did
not believe the CFPB had legal authority. Colin Dwyer, Pentagon Was Not
Notified Of ProposalTo Change MilitaryLen ding Act, NPR (Sept. 11, 2008),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/11/646790785/pentagon-consumer-agency-didntdiscuss-plan-to-relax-oversight-of-military-lendi.
256 Liz Goodwin, Warren's consumer dream dismantled, BOSTON GLOBE
(Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2 018/03/03/warrenrespbnds-mulvaney-cfpb-taunts-this-isnabout/lv53clPjzQ6FrSiNblsjfM/story.html (Not regretting CFPB's single
director structure, Senator Warren explains, "Look at the SEC, which has a
board and has been tangled for years and years and years in partisan bickering.
The consequence of a board has been to freeze the SEC so that it's often not able
to follow through on its mission to protect individual investors.")
257 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing andReforming the Securities and
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Dodd-Frank Act the SEC has yet to meet over 20 percent of its
statutorily-mandated rulemaking deadlines.25 8
The SEC's performance, however, is not reflective of all
commissions. The CFTC, which has a similar leadership
structure, 25 9 has largely met its Dodd-Frank mandatory
rulemaking deadlines. 2 6 0 The multi-member, bipartisan led
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")2 6 1 also met its
statutorily-mandated rulemakings under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996,262 which was the first major overhaul of the 1934
Communications Act.26 3 Congress gave the FCC six months to
implement the statutory program.26 4 On the day of the deadline,
the FCC released a 737-page document, containing the regulations
necessary to implement the new law.2 65
IV. INDEPENDENCE IS STILL IMPORTANT
As a political (not necessarily constitutional) matter, the
CFPB's structural design arguably went too far in insulating it
Exchange Commission: Lessons from Literature on Change Leadership, 55
VIL. L. REv. 627, 632-34 (2010).
2.. The SEC has failed to meet seventeen of its seventy-five mandatory
rulemaking deadlines. Document: Mandatory Dodd-Frank Act Rulemaking
Deadlines (on file with author).
259 See HOGUE, ET AL., supra note 108, at 8-18 (both led by five
commissioners with staggered terms and no more than three commissioners can
be from the same political party).
260 The CFTC has met all but six of its fifty-one mandatory rulemaking
deadlines. Document: Mandatory Dodd-Frank Act Rulemaking Deadlines (on
file with author).
261 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) ("The maximum number of commissioners who
may be members of the same political party shall be a number equal to the least
number of commissioners which constitutes a majority of the full membership
of the Commission.").
262 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
263 See TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, FCC.GOV (last updated June 20,
("The
https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996
2013),
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is the first major overhaul of
telecommunications law in almost 62 years.").
264 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) (Supp. II 1997) ("Within 6 months after February
8, 1996, the Commission shall complete all actions necessary to establish
regulations to implement the requirements of this section.").
265 First Report and Order, 96 F.C.C. 325 (1996); David Solomon, 68 FED.
CoMM. L.J. 60 (Feb. 2016) ("The FCC acted unanimously in virtually all its early
1996 Act implementation decisions.").
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from both branches, but it does not follow that Congress was
misguided in making it independent.
Keeping the CFPB's independence means it would remain
on equal footing with all other federal financial regulators, which
was a critical aspect of the Obama administration's proposal for
financial reform.26 6 Sound reasons exist for separating financial
regulation from partisan politics. The work of financial
regulation-whether it is setting monetary policy or regulating the
systematic risk of financial institutions or markets (e.g., securities
or futures) or a financial product or activity (e.g., credit cards or
payment processing)-requires developing policies based more on
technical expertise and much less on political ideology. When
financial regulators are insulated from changes in administration,
their policies are more likely to be based on subject matter
expertise than influenced by political concerns. Moreover, these
regulators' functions are not entirely executive. They have
legislative (i.e., rulemaking) and judicial (i.e., adjudicating
hearings) powers, and therefore, it would be inappropriate to house
these agencies under the executive branch, subject to presidential
control.
Also, an independent agency would benefit the Bureau's
public servants, who too often are forgotten in the escalating
partisan warfare of Washington. During Mulvaney's tenure, there
was the "largest exodus" in the agency's workforce since its
creation,2 6 7 and morale certainly suffered.26 8 As one CFPB
employee confided, "I think there is a great deal of confusion and
uncertainty ... and fear about what a director that once called our
organization a 'sick joke' might do at [its] helm."2 69 In his
266 FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM,

supra note 48, at 58.

O'Harrow Jr. et al., supra note 5. The attrition was not unexpected.
Mulvaney's top aides considered moving employees to the basement of its
headquarters office, relocating others to Dallas, and having employees share
desks. Elizabeth Dexheimer, Mulvaney's CFPB ConsidersMoving Staff to the
Basement, or Dallas, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 1, 2018),
167

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-01/mulvaney-s-cfpbconsiders-moving-staff-to-basement-or-to-dallas.
268 Sylvan Lane, ConsumerBureau Morale Plummeted Under Mulvaney:
Report THE HILL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/421007consumer-bureau-morale-plummeted-under-mulvaney-analysis.
269 Allan Smith, Employees Dish on the Chaos Gripping America's Top
Consumer Watchdog Agency Amid a Dramatic Showdown with Trump,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.sg/cfpbemployees-mulvaney-english-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump2017-11/.
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resignation letter, CFPB's Assistant Director & Student Loan
Ombudsman Seth Frotman accused leadership of "repeatedly
undercut[ting] and undermin[ing] career CFPB staff working to
secure relief for consumers."270 One public servant perhaps
summarized it best:
I personally find it sad to see the organization that was
intended to be a nonpartisan organization charged with
the important mission of protecting consumers being
dragged into a political fight. The CFPB has consistently
been characterized as partisan when, I would argue, our
record - and mission - is not.2 71
With the growing ideological divide about the role of
government,2 7 2 the Bureau and its legislative mandate should not
be stuck in a political tug of war.
A. Returning to Tradition and Convention
CFPB detractors complain that the Bureau's structural
deficiencies are yet another example of government overreach.
With a constitutionally well-established structure, however, they
would have to focus on the agency's policies rather than its
legitimacy. CFPB supporters should shift the attention back to
protecting American consumers by compromising and reforming
the agency's structure.
Professor Roberta Romano also argues that the Bureau's
structure should be changed, but for different reasons. In her
article, she uses empirical data to prove that the CFPB is less
democratically accountable than other independent agencies with
more conventional structures, and therefore, should be
redesigned.27 3 To evaluate accountability, she tests how often
270 Resignation Letter from Seth Frotman to Acting Director Mick
2018),
27,
(Aug.
Mulvaney
https://static.politico.com/ff/88/08ab4cda4c9491650caba9d90fbb/frotmanletter.pdf. Former colleague Frotman also accused the leadership of
"suppress[ing] the publication of a report prepared by Bureau staff" that showed
the nation's largest banks were charging students excessive fees. Id.
271 Smith, supra note 269.
272 See KAISER, supra note 46, at 384 ("Political scientists who study
polarization in Congress have found that, judged by the votes they cast,
Republican members have become steadily more conservative over the last
generation, and have moved to the right more quickly than Democrats have
moved to the left.").
273 Romano, supranote 10, at 273.
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agencies use what she considers as "the most publicly accountable
regulatory instrument: notice-and-comment rulemaking,"274 as set
forth under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 27 5 Her statistical analysis shows that the CFPB uses
notice-and-comment rulemaking less frequently than the CPSC,
the CFTC, and the SEC, which are each led by a multi-member
commission. She reasons that the problem lies in the Bureau's
degree of insulation from the political branches because it is the
only agency led by a single director and not subject to
congressional appropriations or reauthorization.
Professor
Romano recommends that Congress make the CFPB subject to the
appropriations process and design the agency as either (i) an
independent multi-member commission, with partisan balance
requirements or (ii) an executive branch agency, with a single
director serving at the will of the president. 27 6
As Figure 1 shows, there are any number of combinations
of agency features that would make the CFPB more accountable
to the political branches. For example, as Professor Romano
suggests, Congress could amend Title X to subject the agency to
the regular appropriations process, regardless of whether the
CFPB becomes an independent commission or an executive
branch agency. 277 Her proposal is not without merit. If Congress
had had more oversight authority in 2018, it could have influenced
the Bureau's activities under Mulvaney by simply adjusting its
funding or placing limitations on the use of appropriated funds.
But then the Bureau would have less independence than the
prudential regulators, signaling that consumer protection is once
again subordinated to safety and soundness concerns. This would
directly contradict a key lesson learned from the financial crisis:
protecting consumers is just as important as ensuring stability in
the financial system.2 7 8
274

Id. at 273. She believes that because unelected officials draft and finalize

regulations, "the political legitimacy of rulemaking" requires "public
participation under 'procedures designed to ensure the rationality of the
agency's decision."' She further explains that "public comments can illuminate
gaps in an agency's knowledge and provide an understanding of real-world
conditions, as well as assist an agency in gauging a rule's acceptance by those
affected." Id. at 277-78.
275 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
276 Romano, supra note 10,
at 330-31.
277 Id. at 33
L.
278 "[W]e need to acknowledge that the failure
to protect consumers is not
just a moral failing. It can also cause the collapse of our largest financial
institutions,
upon
which
our
very
economy
relies.
Consumer
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Also, as a practical matter, the political environment is such
that it would stretch credulity to expect House Democrats to
subject any independent agency to congressional appropriations.
The operations of both the SEC and the FTC came to a standstill
for an unprecedented thirty-five days in December 2018 and
January 2019.279 Their lack of funding was wholly unrelated to
their policies or regulatory agenda. With expectations of another
government shutdown, 28 0 House Democrats are unlikely to agree
to, use Congress' power of the purse to make the Bureau only
"theoretically" more accountable.
The following sections address the two solutions that
Professor Romano believes are equally suitable to making the
CFPB more democratically accountable. This Article suggests she
protections. . .should be on an equal footing with supervision that ensures the
safety and soundness of our financial system." Sen. Christopher J. Dodd Holds
a News Conference on Priorities for the Next Congress, 2008 WL 4817177 (Nov.
6. 2008). Other academic scholars have reached a similar conclusion. Adam J.
Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation:RegulatingCreditMarkets Upstream, 26 YALE
J. ON REG. 143 (2009).
279 Lisa Rein et al., FederalEmployees Return to Backlog of Work After
2019),
28,
(Jan.
POST
WASH.
Shutdown,
35-Day
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-employees-return-tobacklog-of-work-after-35-day-shutdown/2019/01/28/10030766-23 1c- 1e9-81fdb7bo5d5bed90_story.html?utmterm=.d274de772c34; Denise Lu & Anjali
Singhvi, Government Shutdown Timeline: See How the Effects are Piling Up,
2019),
28,
(Jan.
TIMES
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/08/us/politics/governmentshutdown-calendar.html.
280 See, e.g., Caitlin Emma & Jennifer Scholtes, Trump's Budget Sets Up
POLITICO,
Battle,
Shutdown
Another
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/1 1/trump-fiscal-budget-2020-1215609
(last updated Mar. 11, 2019, 3:07 PM). The appropriations process is no longer
an effective tool to make independent agencies fall into line when the budget is
subject to wholesale government shutdowns. See Ian Shapira, Meet the
Democrat Who Paved the Way for Government Shutdowns. Yes, a Democrat,
2019),
17,
(Jan.
POST
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/17/meet-democrat-whopaved-way-government-shutdowns-yes-democrat/?utm term=.e4794a3lfc0b
("I couldn't have ever imagined these shutdowns would last this long of a time
and would be used as a political gambit."). Moreover, it would be surprising if
House Democrats subjected another consumer protection agency to
congressional appropriations. See Jon Schuppe, Shutdown Blocks Help for
Identity Victims, as FTC Goes Dark, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2019, 1:34 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/shutdown-blocks-help-identity-theftvictims-ftc-goes-dark-n95 7721.
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is only partially correct. The CFPB must be restructured, but how
the agency is designed-as an executive branch agency or as an
independent commission-leads to substantially divergent
regulatory outcomes that would have considerable import to
financial innovation, the industry, and consumer welfare.
B. Executive Branch Agency
There are sound reasons for having an agency head serve
at the president's pleasure. Then-Professor Elena Kagan's
constitutional theory of "presidential administration" provides two
benefits of presidential oversight of executive branch agencies: (1)
regulatory effectiveness; and (2) accountability.28 1 Kagan describes
the first benefit, regulatory effectiveness, to include "technocratic
values" such as "cost-effectiveness, consistency, and rational
priority-setting." 282 As a "unitary actor" in control of the executive
branch, the president can set forth a consistent policy view across
all agencies through OIRA's centralized review of regulatory
agendas.28 3 Kagan's second benefit is quite simple. Executive
branch agencies are under the direction of the president who is
accountable to the American people, and the American people elect
a president whose policy views most closely align to theirs.
These views appear to be consistent with Professor
Romano's. To be sure, she does not compare the CFPB with any
executive branch agency, and thus, her analysis does not address
how often such agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking. Her
indifference to how the Bureau should be structured suggests that
her main opposition to the CFPB's current structure is its general
lack of accountability to the political branches. In her discussion of
a failed Republican House bill that would have restructured the
CFPB into an executive branch agency, she opines, "[T]he key fact
is that, had the bill been enacted, compared to the present
arrangement, the agency would have been rendered more
accountable to elected officeholders." 2 84
281 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 1L4 HARV. L.
REv. 2245,
2331-47 (2001).
282 Id. at 2339.
183 But see note 127 and accompanying text. Title
X requires that proposed
or finalized rules or orders by the CFPB and the Federal Reserve be treated
similarly. See 44 U.S.C. § 3513 (2012). This raises an interesting issue. Even if
the Supreme Court were to restructure the Bureau into an executive agency by
striking the "for cause" provision, it is unclear that the CFPB would then
become subject to OIRA's review process.

28

Romano, supra note 10, at 317.
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Yet, restructuring the CFPB into an executive branch
agency would not put the Bureau on more stable political footing
to implement Title X's objectives. The problems that happened
under Mulvaney's tenure exposed the uncertainty that occurs
when a financial regulator effectively operates as an executive
agency. Such a legislative solution would basically endorse the
unpredictable variability in policy caused by political change in
administrations. Regulatory uncertainty would become the new
normal, and as discussed in the following section, the lack of
predictability would hinder financial innovation. Surely, the
CFPB should not be restructured just because it would make it
more accountable to one of the political branches. In my view,
determining the agency structure that would be more suitable for
regulating the consumer financial services industry is the decisive
issue.
C Multi-member, Bipartisan Commission
Professor Romano suggests reforming CFPB to a
commission because then the agency would more likely use the
most publicly accountable instrument, notice-and-commentrulemaking. I agree with her suggestion, but for entirely different
reasons.
First, it is not clear. that such rulemaking is in fact the most
publicly accountable regulatory instrument. APA section 553(b)
requires agencies to publish in the Federal Register a notice that
includes "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or
description of the subjects and issues involved."28 5 Section 553(c)
requires agencies to provide the public with an opportunity to
submit comments, which agencies must review and evaluate. It
also requires agencies to explain the basis for its final rule.2 8 6 The
APA certainly speaks to public accountability, but the courts'
interpretation of it has led to contradictory results. For example,
the CFPB generally publishes the full text of its actual proposed
regulation even though section 553(b) calls for much less.2 87 The
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1966).
286 Id. § 553(c).
See, e.g., Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules under the Real Estate
28
Settlement Procedures Act and the Truth in Lending Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg.
72,160 (Oct. 19, 2016) (explaining agency's provisions are finalized or adopted
"largely as proposed"); Defining Larger Participants of the Automobile
Financing Market and Defining Certain Automobile Leasing Activity as a
Financial Product or Service Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 30, 2015)
("The Bureau is now issuing this final rule . .. largely as proposed.");
285
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Bureau publishes substantially more information because courts
test the adequacy of an agency's notice by evaluating whether the
final rule is a "logical outgrowth" of the proposal.28 8 Moreover,
courts have held that a final rule cannot "substantially depart"
from the proposed rule, resulting in increased pressure to draft a
proposed rulemaking in such a way that it can be finalized largely
as proposed. 28 9 This inevitably leads to delays. For instance, the
CFPB published its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for its Debt
Collection Rule, nearly six years after it issued the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.2 90
The practice of reviewing the public's comments and
nevertheless finalizing rules largely as proposed suggests that the
comments have limited value.2 9 1 Industry and consumer advocacy
groups are well aware of this and often provide draft regulatory
language to the CFPB's Office of Research, Markets, and
Regulations well in advance of the Bureau's notice of proposed
Amendment to the Annual Privacy Notice Requirement Under the GrammLeach-Bliley Act Final Rule 79 Fed. Reg. 64,057 (agency is "adopting"
provisions "substantially as proposed" or "largely as proposed").
288 Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ("The
relationship between the proposed regulation and the final rule determines the
adequacy of notice. A difference between the two will not invalidate the notice
so long as the final rule is a 'logical outgrowth' of the one proposed. If the
deviation from the proposal is too sharp, the affected parties will not have had
adequate notice and opportunity for comment.").
289 Chocolate Mfrs. Assoc. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098,1105 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[I]f
the final rule 'substantially departs' from the terms or substance of the proposed
rule," the notice is inadequate.").
290 Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F), 84 Fed. Reg. 23,274 (proposed
rule, May 21, 2019); Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848
(advanced notice of proposed rule, Nov. 12, 2013).
291 To be clear, pursuant to section 553(c), agencies must review all
comments and respond accordingly. If the agency were to make a substantial
change in the proposed rule, then the agency must reopen the comment period
or risk a 553(b) challenge. Notably certain agencies take a more democratic
approach to rulemaking and go beyond the process set forth under section 553.
For example, the FCC routinely provides the public two comment periods: (1)
an opportunity to submit comments to a proposed rulemaking; (2) and an
opportunity to reply to what others have said in the first comment period.
Rulemaking at the FCC, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/rulemaking-fcc
(last visited June 24, 2019). This reply period provides the public an opportunity
to address concerns with others' initial comments. Other agencies including the
National Labor Relations Board, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, and the U.S. Regulatory Commission have also
provided a reply period for their rulemakings.
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rulemaking. There is nothing untoward about special interests
petitioning agency officials, but the rulemaking process has
evolved to where organized groups have access and ordinary
Americans do not. It is not evident why a process that effectively
allows interest groups more access to influence government
regulations has greater democratic legitimacy than a process that
relies on impartial bureaucrats with expertise.
Second, Congress provides agencies with a regulatory
toolkit spanning an array of instruments (like supervisory
examinations or investigations) that have little to no public
involvement. Though such tools lack a public comment process,
that does not necessarily make them inferior or suspect. Also,
because the courts' interpretation of section 553 has made
rulemaking increasingly burdensome, good reasons exist for using
other regulatory tools. Proposing and finalizing regulations is a
multi-year endeavor and would be an ill-suited means for
overseeing a fast-changing marketplace. This is especially true in
the consumer financial services industry where startups are using
advancements in technology to displace market incumbents.
General policy statements or guidance documents would be a
much more effective means for CFPB to protect consumers while
keeping pace with industry developments. Unlike amending
regulations, policy statements and guidance documents are more
easily modified to address rapid technological advancements.2 9 2
With incentives for decreasing the use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, it is not a reliable indicator for democratic legitimacy.
Third, political accountability is critical, but it is not always
the most important factor. While substantial academic literature
exists about how Congress or the President can better control the
modern administrative state through institutional design, 93 there
is far less research determining the agency structure best suited for
any given regulated industry. This Article proposes that for
consumer financial services, an industry beset by "disruptive

292 Romano, supra note 10, at 333 ("[G]uidance can be reversed.. .with
relative ease, in contrast to policies implemented through notice and comment,
which can be reversed solely by using that more arduous process once again,
with judicial examination of the new rationale.").
293 E.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the FourthBranch,84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1994); Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart
Intelhgence: Structuringand OverseeingAgencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94
CAL. L. REv. 1655 (2006).
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political
predictability-not
regulatory
technologies," 2 9 4
accountability-is a far more essential feature of an agency's
structure.
An agency led by a multi-member, bipartisan commission,
where members have staggered terms, would provide the
consumer financial services industry much needed regulatory
predictability. A change in administration would not lead to a
wholesale change in the agency's leadership, and thus, agency
actions are not subject to ideological swings. When presidents
nominate an individual (someone who likely shares their policy
views), a multi-member commission limits the influence of any
single person. The partisan balance requirement (i.e., no more than
a simple majority from one political party) means that agency
actions are more likely based on informed decisions reached
through debate and compromise. Minority views can also help
temper those of the majority.2 95 Finally, having staggered terms
generally avoids multiple vacancies occurring at the same time,
providing continuity and stability in the agency's leadership.
Without an agency structure that promotes stability, it is near
impossible to have regulatory predictability.
And such predictability is necessary in the consumer
financial services industry. First, regulated entities need
consistency in their obligations and predictable enforcement
standards. Without this, companies are more likely to focus on
"reading tea leaves" than on increasing consumer welfare through
innovative products. Worse, if the regulatory environment
becomes so unpredictable that firms consider the CFPB's
enforcement actions as random or arbitrary, then "playing by the
rules" no longer provides a competitive advantage and firms
become incentivized to race to the bottom.
Second, when a regulator provides a stable and predictable
business environment, it encourages a company to make
investments in research and development to improve its own
operations. It also encourages lenders to provide companies with
funding. Such a business environment invites venture capitalists
and private equity firms to invest. In contrast, regulatory

294

See generallyKLAUs SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

(2016) (proposes that the world is at the beginning of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution in which disruptive technologies will have an unprecedented level
of impact.).
295 See generallyCass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go
to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (discussing implications of group
polarization and importance of hearing other viewpoints).
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uncertainty makes investing less attractive.2 9 6 Economics teaches
us that an investment's expected value or return is simply the sum
of all anticipated returns on investment multiplied by the
likelihood (i.e., probability) of each of those returns occurring.2 97
When there is regulatory unpredictability, the likelihood of
achieving the return on investment either becomes reduced or too

difficult to even determine. In either instance, the investment's
expected value decreases as the probability of realizing any benefit
is lowered. Consequently, firms may delay making an investment
until there is more regulatory stability, or worse, refrain from
investing altogether. Lenders may also be less willing to provide
funding. Similarly, venture capitalists and private equity firms
may invest in other areas where there is more stability and
predictability.
Consumers in the market for financial products and
services lose when businesses delay or refrain from making
investments in technology such as artificial intelligence ("Al"),
which is considered the "most disruptive technology of the modern
era." 2 9 8 With respect to the consumer financial services industry,
developments in Al and some of its sub-fields-machine learning,
deep learning, natural language processing-have the potential to
increase

consumers'

access

to

credit,

leading

to

the

democratization of the industry. With machine learning, lenders
can use "big data" to make better credit decisions, lowering the cost
of credit. They can also use "alternative data" to serve consumers
who previously had limited access to credit because they lacked a
traditional credit score. Deep learning, which is a more advanced
form of machine learning, can help companies detect fraud, also
lowering the cost of credit. With natural language processing,
individuals who use sign language can communicate with
customer service representatives who don't. Surely, investment in

296 See AVINAH

K.

DIxIT

&

ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER

UNCERTAINTY 282 (1994) ("[A]n environment of ongoing uncertainty. .. has
effect of making firms less eager to invest.... [U]ncertainty makes waiting more
valuable and discourages immediate investment.").
297
CalculatingExpected Rate of Return, JONATHAN LAW, BUSINESS, THE
ULTIMATE RESOURCE (3d ed. 2011).

The formula for an investment's expected return is:
E[r]=Es P(s)rs
where E[r] is the expected return, (s) is the probability that the rs occurs, and
rs is the anticipated return.
298 Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, ArtificialIntelgence:Risks to Privacy
andDemocracy, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 106, 108 (2019).
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Al has tremendous potential to increase consumer welfare.
Today's business environment, however, does not
encourage companies to invest because of increased regulatory
uncertainty since Cordray's departure. Under his tenure, the
CFPB took the lead in enforcing consumer protection statutes and
influencing market behavior. When Trump picked an acting
director, who had referred to the CFPB as a "joke," many state
attorneys general announced they would step in if the Bureau's
enforcement approach changed.29 9 Mulvaney embraced their offer.
In a February 2018 speech to the National Association of Attorneys
General, Mulvaney declared that the CFPB would leave consumer
protection enforcement to states and turn its attention to consumer
education."oo Now, California and others are considering creating
a "state level CFPB" or "mini-CFPB."o1 Maryland,3 0 2 New

29 In a December 17, 2017 letter to Trump, the attorneys general of New
York, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon, Vermont, Virginia and Washington State wrote, "Regardless of the
future direction or leadership of the CFPB, we as state attorneys general will
vigorously enforce state and federal laws to ensure fairness and deter fraud."
Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney General, et al., to President
Donald
J.
Trump
(Dec.
12,
2017),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/sign-onletterre-cfpb.pdf.

" CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU ACTING DIRECTOR
MICK MULVANEY (C-SPAN Feb. 28, 2018).
311 CahforniaLawmaker Explores Creatinga "State CFPB" NATIVE AM.
FIN. SERVICES Ass'N (Mar. 28, 2019), https://nativefinance.org/news/californialawmaker-explores-creating-a-state-cfpb/.
302 On May 15, 2018, Maryland Governor signed into law the Financial
Consumer Protection Act of 2018. H.B. 1634 (Md. 2018).
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30
have already done so.
and Pennsylvaniao
To date, Arizona, Wyoming, and Utah have created their own
fintech "regulatory sandboxes."o 6 In December 2018, while still
under Mulvaney's leadership, the Bureau proposed changes to its
approach to financial innovation. 3 o The Conference of State Bank

Jersey,30 3 New York 3

News Release, Office of the Attorney General of N.J., Attorney General
Grewal Announces New Leadership at the Division of Consumer Affairs (Mar.
27, 2018), https:/nj.gov/oag/newsreleasesl8/pr20180327a.html.
304 On April 29, 2019, the New York State Department of Financial
Services announced its new Consumer Protection and Financial Enforcement
division. Press Release, Dep't of Fin. Services of N.Y., Acting DFS
Superintendent Lacewell Announced Appointment of Katherine Lemire as
Executive Deputy Superintendent of Newly Created Consumer Prot.
2019),
29,
(Apr.
Division
Enforcement
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports-and-publications/press-releases/prl904291.
Earlier in 2019, New York Attorney General hired former colleague,
Christopher D'Angelo to serve as the Chief Deputy Attorney General for
Economic Justice. He helped stand up the CFPB, and over the years wore many
hats, taking on the most recent in 2016 as the Associate Director of Supervision,
Enforcement and Fair Lending. Kate Berry, CFPB'sNo. 3 to depart,join New
2019),
24,
(Jan.
BANKER
AM.
AG,
York
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-no-3-to-depart-join-new-yorkag.
30s On July 20, 2017, Pennsylvania Attorney General announced a new
Consumer Financial Protection Unit that would be led by former colleague,
Nicholas Smyth who helped stand up CFPB and served as an enforcement
attorney. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of Pa., Attorney General
Josh Shapiro Announces Consumer Financial Protection Unit (July 20, 2017),
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/attorneygeneral-josh-shapiro-announces-consumer-financial-protection-unit/.
306 Press Release, Az. Attorney General, Arizona Becomes First State in
U.S. to Offer Fintech Regulatory Sandbox (last visited June 17, 2019),
https://www.azag.gov/press-release/arizona-becomes-first-state-us-offerfintech-regulatory-sandbox; H.B. 57, 65th Leg. (Wyo. 2019); H.B. 378, 63rd Leg.
(Utah 2019). For a discussion about the history of regulatory sandboxes, see
Ryoji Kashiwagi, The Rise of the Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. IT (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://financialit.net/blog/rise-regulatory-sandbox.
307 On December 13, 2018, the Bureau published in the Federal Register a
notice ("2018 Notice") seeking public comments on (i) a proposed change to its
2016 Policy on No-Action Letters ("2016 Policy") and (ii) the creation of a
"Product Sandbox." 83 Fed. Reg. 64,036 (Dec. 13, 2018).
Under the 2016 Policy, a company may apply for a No-Action Letter (NAL),
which states that the "CFPB staff has no present intention to recommend an
enforcement or supervisory action" for a limited time period, if the entity agrees
to certain data-sharing requirements. 81 Fed. Reg. 8686 (Feb. 22, 2016). Under
the 2018 Notice, the Bureau would streamline the application process, would be
&
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Supervisors and 22 state attorneys general have expressed their
opposition to these changes on state preemption grounds, and a
race to the courthouse seems certain.30 8 States will inevitably have
differing enforcement approaches and regulatory sandbox
parameters. For startups, market incumbents, and investors, the
more open to UDAAP-based NALs, eliminate data sharing as well as the
temporal nature of the letter. Further, the CFPB intends to respond to any
company's application within 60 days and the NAL would be "issued by duly
authorized officials of the Bureau to provide recipients greater assurance that
the Bureau itself stands behind the no-action relief" instead of being a staff
recommendation. The proposed changes ("NAL Proposal") are "designed to
increase the utilization" of the No-Action Letter, but it is not clear how beneficial
such a letter is when Kraninger has stated that education-not enforcement-is
the Bureau's first priority. Moreover, obtaining a UDAAP-based NAL has
substantial downside risks because states have similar laws. Former colleague
Dan Quan said it best, "You're literally drawing a state target on your back."
Lydia Beyoud, 2019 Outlook: CFPB Innovation Policies May Face State
Challenges,

BLOOMBERG

LAW

(Dec.

28,

2018),

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/2019-outlook-cfpb-innovationpolicies-may-face-state-challenges.
The Bureau's Product Sandbox is remarkable in its scope. First it would
allow a trade association to apply on behalf of an entire industry. Second, it
would provide substantially the same relief under the NAL Proposal as well two
additional forms of relief that would be legally binding on the agency and other
parties, such as states and private parties, for an expected period of two years:
(i) approvals by order under the statutory provisions giving an entity a safe
harbor; and (ii) exemptions by order from statutory or regulatory provisions.
Again, by CFPB's own leadership statements about decreased enforcement
activity, entities may have little to gain and are more likely to get caught in the
crossfire between states and the CFPB.
...Letter from John Ryan, President & CEO of CSBS, to Paul Watkins,
Assistant Director of the CFPB (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.csbs.org/csbsstrongly-opposes-cfpb-preemption-state-authority-using-fintech-sandbox
("State regulators strongly oppose the attempt to preempt state enforcement
authority via the creation of the Product Sandbox"); Letitia James, Attorney
General of N.Y., to Kathy Kraninger, Director of the CFPB (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/cfpb-naland-sandboxcommentfinal.pdf
("[A]pprovals or exemptions granted by the CFPB would purportedly confer on
the recipient immunity... from. a CFPB enforcement action. . .[and] from
'enforcement actions by any Federal or State authorities, as well as from
lawsuits brought by private parties.' The CFPB has no authority to issue such
sweeping immunity absent formal rulemaking."); ConsumerBureau'sShocking
New "No ConsumerProtection"Policy,NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. (Dec. 11,
2018),
https://www.nclc.org/media-center/pr-consumer-bureau-s-shockingnew-no-consumer-protection-policy.html
("The CFPB's proposals are
unlawful, outside its authority, and undoubtedly will face a legal challenge.").
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investment calculation appears more complicated today than
under Cordray's tenure. Moreover, it is unclear whether there
would even be countervailing consumer benefits.30 9
Congress could, of course, do nothing. It can take a waitand-see approach to whether a circuit split arises and whether the
Supreme Court holds the agency unconstitutional. These events,
however, are largely inevitable-in fact, expected. It is entirely
foreseeable that the Court will strike the "for cause" provision,
thereby making the Bureau an executive branch agency. The
CFPB's director then would serve at the pleasure of the president,
and every political change in administration foreshadows a
challenging transition-resulting in the exact opposite outcome
from the independent consumer financial protection regulation
that Title X had intended. The Supreme Court's involvement
would effectively put its seal of approval on allowing erratic policy
changes to affect the consumer financial services industry. Such a
scenario is not conjecture. Within two months of taking over the
CFPB, Acting Director Mulvaney changed the regulatory agency's
mission statement to explicitly focus on deregulation.3 1 0
Accordingly, Congress' inaction would be akin to ceding
New Way to Deregulate, BLOOMBERG
2019),
15,
(Feb.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-15/regulators-createsandboxes-as-a-place-to-foster-fintech ("Ten years ago, we went through a crisis
because the loosening of regulations permitted institutions to take on risk at the
expense of the consumer," says [Maria] Vullo, the former New York regulator.
"It's like people have amnesia.").
310 The agency originally described its mission as follows:
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a 21st century agency
that helps consumer finance markets work by making rules more
effective, by consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by
empowering consumers to take more control over their economic
lives.
Under Acting Director Mulvaney, the agency changed its mission to focus on
deregulation:
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a 21st century agency
that helps consumer finance markets work by regularly identifying
or burdensome
and addressing outdated, unnecessary,
regulations, by making rules more effective, by consistently
enforcing federal consumer financial law, and by empowering
consumers to take more control over their economic lives.
Ian Milliser, Under Trump, the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau isn't
even pretending to protect consumers, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://thinkprogress.org/cfpb-protect-consumers-8d50e60ba5d6/.
309
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control to the political winds. Let's assume arguendo that the
Supreme Court weighs in before 2024. As Figure 2 shows,1 1 the
rate of investment in financial innovation would hinge on the
result of upcoming elections.
Figure 2. Congress Inaction Leads to Unacceptable Results
2020 Elections

2024 Electionls

Republicans Maintain Control
Republicans Maintain Control

Focus on educating consumers

Kraninger finishes term
Could resign before 2023, giving
Trump another nommnation.

Democrats Regain Control

Focus on educating consumers

Excessive Policy Variability

Decreased Investment
Reduced Cnsumer Welfare

Decsion
by 2024*

Republicans Regain Control
Democrats Regain Control
President fires Kraninger and
installs a new director
Excessive PolicyVariality
Decreased Investment
Reduced Consumer Welfare

Excessive Policy Voriability
Decreasedinvestment
Rpcede Cnsmer Wefare

Democrats Maintain Control

Focus on being a cop on the beat

For Democrats, Republicans retaining control through to
2028 likely means more than enough time will have passed to
eliminate most (if not all) consumer protections gained under
Cordray's tenure. Such a result should be unacceptable for
Democrats.
For Republicans, Democrats
regaining and
maintaining control through 2028 means that Kraninger could be
fired and a Democrat-installed director could well be serving into
2030. Resignations and the Federal Vacancy Act can be used to the
Democrats' advantage just as it was. for Republicans under
Trump. This outcome should be similarly objectionable for
Republicans. Most problematic, however, are when the
311 For illustrative purposes only, this Article addresses just the 2020 and
2024 presidential elections. Because a presidential nominee must be confirmed

by the Senate, the agency's future is also contingent on which party controls the
Senate (and by how many seats). Therefore, the Senate seats up for reelection
(and of those, which are in play) in 2020, 2022, 2024 and 2026 are also important.
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administration changes between political parties every four years.
the
over
debate
serious
the
Notwithstanding
constitutionality of the CFPB, a pressing concern is the health of
the consumer financial services industry. The only long-term
solution is for Congress to reform the agency's structure in a way
that maintains its independence. Why? For one rather simple
reason: A financial regulator beholden to the president leads to
unpredictability and excessive variability in policy with every
political change in administration.
CONCLUSION
Something has to give. The Great Recession proved that
consumer financial protection is critical to the country's financial
system. It is far too important for its regulator to be at the mercy
of political whims.
A Democrat-controlled Congress along with a Democratic
president sought to create an independent regulatory agency that
would be politically-insulated from changes in administration and
from congressional horse-trading. They designed the CFPB unlike
any other despite Republicans' strong opposition to even creating
a new regulator. The party that unsuccessfully introduced over 165
bills seeking to eliminate or reform the Bureau must feel vindicated
to some extent. After all, it was the CFPB's own acting director
who revealed how Democrats' best laid plans had the perverse
effect of politicizing the agency. Now that both parties, however,
have seen how Title X operates in practice, it should be evident
that Congress must reach a compromise that reforms the Bureau
into a multi-member, bipartisan commission.3 12 Yet, there is little
appetite. Independent Community Bankers of America Executive
Paul Merski explained the political environment best, "With the
divided Congress, it's challenging because both sides of the aisle
look at a commission differently. When Director Cordray was in
there, the commission was viewed as a way to undermine Cordray

312 Notably, members of both parties are well aware of this. In March 2018,
Representatives Dennis A. Ross (R-FL), Krysten Sinema (D-AZ), David Scott
(D-GA), and Ann Wagner (R-MO) introduced legislation that would have
restructured the agency to a multi-member, bipartisan commission where
members have staggered terms. Financial Product Safety Commission Act of
2018, H.R. 5266, 115th Cong. (as referred to House Financial Services
Committee, Mar. 13, 2018). The bipartisan bill had fourteen Republicans and
two Democratic sponsors, but it was never scheduled for markup, and thus,
never debated in committee.

2 019

Commissioningthe CFPB

499

by the Democrats. Now that you have Kathy Kraninger in there,
the commission may be viewed as a way to undermine her for
Republicans.""
However, should Congress fail to reform the Bureau, it
would likely repeat the futile cycle of the last few years. Although
CFPB supporters might resist the idea of any reform that
seemingly weakens the Bureau, such a view is shortsighted. Either
of the alternatives to legislative reform-doing nothing or waiting
until the Supreme Court possibly forces change by finding the
agency's current structure unconstitutional-risks losing an
effective centerpiece of President Obama's financial reform legacy:
a strong and stable agency that gives "consumer protection an
independentseat at the table in our financial regulatory system." 3 14

Neil Haggerty, CFPB commission goes from idea to afterthough4 AM.
BANKER (May 30, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbcommission-goes-from-idea-to-afterthought. To be fair, both parties are not
misguided in being wary of restructuring the agency. Since 2011, Republicans
introduced over fifteen bills seeking to reform the Bureau into a commission. In
fact, they proposed such legislation in the 112th, 113th, 114th, and 115th
Congress, but have yet to introduce a similar bill in the 116th Congress.
Document: Analysis of CFPB-Related Bills Proposed from January 5, 2011 to
June 15, 2019 (on file with author). It is understandable why Democrats may
now be amendable to a director serving at the pleasure of the President. If
Democrats reclaim the White House in the 2020 election, Kraninger's tenure
becomes questionable. It is also understandable why Republicans are unlikely
to agree to restructuring the agency's leadership now that Kraninger is at the
helm. For the political parties to compromise and reform the agency's structure,
the effective date for transitioning to a commission must be far enough into the
future such that there would be sufficient political uncertainty. One only has to
look to H.R. 4173 (as passed in the House in December 2009) to find an example
of how to draft such a compromise.
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added).

FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 48, at 56 (emphasis

